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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN N A TU RE IN NEW ENGLAND
1687-1787
ABSTRACT
Between 1680 and 1720 New England divines predominantly described 
human nature from an avowedly theocentric stance. After 1720 some 
divines began to describe human nature from an anthropocentric position. 
Samuel Willard, John Wise, Jonathan Edwards, Jonathan Mayhew, and 
Charles Chauncy are the subjects of this investigation of the changing 
nature of the theological anthropology in Puritan New England from 1687 to 
1787.
Jerry D. Weber 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN N A TU RE IN NEW ENGLAND
1687-1787
In troduction
The subject under investigation is New England Puritan concepts of 
human nature from 1687, the year Samuel Willard began his sermons on the 
Westminster Assembly’s ShorterCatechism. to 1787, the year Charles 
Chauncy died. Five divines—Samuel Willard, John Wise, Jonathan Edwards, 
Jonathan Mayhew, and Charles Chauncy--have been chosen to illustrate this 
aspect of New England’s thought. Each of these men represents an episode 
in the history of the concept of human nature, and each provides a 
contrast with the others.
Samuel Willard, an orthodox Puritan of the seventeenth century, 
expounded a theocentric theological anthropology affirming a concept of 
human nature as wholly depraved. This view was opposed by John Wise, 
who was influenced by the emerging natural rights theory in the early 
eighteenth century. The champion of orthodox Puritanism in the 
mid-eighteenth century was Jonathan Edwards. Edwards’s concept of human 
nature, theocentric in foundation, emphasized the depravity of humanity as 
well as the natural abilities of humankind. The anthropology of Edwards 
stands in contrast to the anthropologies of his contemporaries, Jonathan 
Mayhew and Charles Chauncy. Like Wise, Mayhew and Chauncy propounded 
an anthropocentric theological anthropology.
The main purpose of this essay is to explicate the d ifferent concepts 
of human nature in Puritan New England. Between 1680 and 1720 New 
England divines predominantly described human nature from an avowed
2
3theocentric stance. After 1720 some divines began to describe human 
nature from an anthropocentric position.1 The concepts of human nature 
espoused by Willard, Wise, Edwards, Mayhew, and Chauncy support a thesis 
of change. Like the economic, political, intellectual, and social worlds, the 
theological world and, in turn, ideas about human nature were changing. 
The objective of this essay will be to document the thesis of change and 
explain the substance of the theological anthropology of New England.
The essay presupposes that opposites exist in any era. The opposites 
of this period are the theocentric and anthropocentric anthropologies of 
five Puritan divines. One manner of describing these opposites through 
history would be to discuss them in terms of trends. This study treats 
these opposites, however, as episodes, with each Puritan divine a historical 
individual who expressed differing relations of the opposites at their 
moment in history.2 The present study is not so much concerned with 
overarching trends as it is concerned with developments and the gener­
ation of an empirically oriented history that adds depth to the existing 
body of knowledge about human nature in American thought.
I
1 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980).
2 For examples of this period discussed in terms of 
trends see Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seven­
teenth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1939); idem, The New England Mind: From Colony to 
Province (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the 
Harvard University Press, 1959); Joseph Haroutunian, Pietv 
Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology
(New York: Holt & Co., 1932).
4The Puritan theological world in seventeenth-century New England 
rested upon three pillars: the doctrines of original sin, human depravity, 
and irresistible grace.3 Descriptions of human nature by Puritans reflect 
these three points. The predecessors of Willard, Wise, Edwards, Mayhew, 
and Chauncy, preachers such as John Cotton, Thomas Hooker, John Norton, 
and Thomas Shepard, described humanity as evil and sinful. Humans in 
their eyes were helpless and de-praved; were it not for a merciful God who 
made a covenant of grace and salvation to the elect, they would suffer in 
hell forever.4
The innate depravity of humankind is a basic theme that runs 
throughout Puritan reflections on human nature. The Puritans in New 
England, however, made two types of statements about the depravity of the 
human condition: one was theological, the other psychological.
Theologically, the Puritans emphasized the fact that humans are "corrupt, 
evil, and impotent," yet psychologically, they "made the most of what 
remained of the divine image and built as much as possible upon the innate 
law of nature or the inborn light of reason."5 On the one hand, they 
stressed the inherently evil aspects of humanity, while on the other they 
highlighted what good remained.
New England divines considered a human being "a whole creature 
imbued with understanding, with a reasonable appetite, with affections 
capable of divine objects, with apprehension and aspirations suitable" to its 
nature, "being able to compare, connect, discourse, deduct, to remember,
3 Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth
Century, p. 22.
4 Curti, Human Nature, pp. 45-46.
5 Ibid., pp. 256, 402.
5and perform other noble parts and actions."6 They characterized humans as 
rational, although divine wisdom transcended the power of reason. They 
believed that knowledge was accumulated through the mind’s apprehension 
of God’s world. External objects were judged by an innate will that could 
distinguish between good and evil.7 The mind, however, became corrupt as 
a result of the fall of Adam. Therefore, reason, they stressed, was a 
treacherous guide.8
In sum, theologically the Puritan forbears declared that humans were 
corrupt, evil, and impotent, while through their faculty psychology they 
described how the mind’s will and reason were out of balance in 
unregenerate human beings.9
During the course of the eighteenth century Willard, Wise, Edwards, 
Mayhew, and Chauncy struggled with these two distinct elements of their 
inherited anthropology—the theological and the psychological. Each of 
these divines would makes choices about which part of their tradition they 
would emphasize. In some instances they infused new elements into their 
thought about human nature. The story that unfolded in the eighteenth 
century reflected the uneasy synthesis that explains seventeenth-century 
New England Puritan concepts of human nature.
6 Ibid., p. 65.
7 Ibid., p. 248.
8 Ibid., p. 71.
9 Ibid., p. 256.
Two Stars of the First Magnitude: 
Samuel Willard and John Wise
Samuel Willard’s and John Wise’s views of human nature were products of 
their Puritan heritage. Willard, born January 31, 1639, twelve years before 
Wise, wrote and preached in terms that would have been familiar to his 
forebears. John Wise, on the other hand, wrote in a manner more akin to 
the eighteenth century than the seventeenth. Each of these ministers 
commented on human nature in his writings. Willard’s A Comoleat Body of 
Divinity (1726) and Wise’s A Vindication of The Government of New 
England Churches (1717) reveal their Puritan derivation.
Willard, orthodox in theology but liberal in the practice of religion, 
undertook the most comprehensive attempt to formulate a catechism of 
American Puritanism. With A Comoleat Body of Divinity, a collection of 
sermons published in 1726, nineteen years after his death, Willard continued 
the rational strain of Puritan thought in his use of the categories of 
faculty psychology. By incorporating the faculty psychology Willard’s 
"summa theologica" disclosed close ties to an intellectual heritage that 
demonstrated humanity’s rational capacities and a tradition of piety.1
A Comoleat Body of Divinity, consisting of 914 folio pages, is "immense,
1 J. Rodney Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions: The 
Faculty Psychology In American Puritanism," Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences 9 (April 1973): 136-137.
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7orderly, systematic, and detailed.”2 The foundation from which Willard 
constructed these sermons, delivered once a month on Tuesday afternoons 
from 1687 to 1707, was the Westminster Assembly’s Shorter Catechism. 
Written in dialogue form, the thirty-three chapters of sermons present the 
central tenets of Puritan theology from a Calvinistic viewpoint. Willard 
stresses the Reformed doctrines of scriptural authority, the absolute 
sovereignty of God, human dependence, predestination, and salvation by 
faith .3 Willard argues, on the one hand, within the framework of the 
covenant theology of New England for the external operations of the Spirit, 
the "effectual calling.” On the other hand, he explains the internal 
operations of the Spirit by means of the faculty psychology.4
Knowledge, for Willard as for earlier Puritans, is a "relationship that 
joins together the knowing mind and the external world." As Ernest Lowrie 
explains Willard’s "light of nature," it is "grounded in God, visible through 
the rational pattern of the given order of the universe," and capable of 
comprehension by the finite intelligence of humans.5 Reason is not 
understanding self-evident propositions, but is a "curious inquiry," a 
collection by the mind through "observation and Experience."6 As it was
2 Samuel Willard, A Comoleat Body of Divinity, foreword 
by Edward M. G riffin  (1726; reprint, New York & London:
Johnson Reprint Corp., 1969), p. v.
3 Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions," p. 136.
4 Ibid., p. 137.
5 Ernest B. Lowrie, The Shape of the Puritan Mind: The 
Thought of Samuel Willard (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1974), p. 30.
6 Perry Miller, The New England Mind: From Colony to 
Province (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the 
Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 428.
8for his forebears, so to for Willard, the mind’s power of internal reasoning 
was a poor guide. In Perry Miller’s words, Samuel Willard’s mind was 
"completely enclosed in the traditional rhetoric and logic."7
John Wise’s mind and writings developed out of the course of Puritan 
thought but had d ifferent emphases; at numerous points he exceeded the 
bounds of traditional covenant theology. Wise defends the church 
constitution of his elders, the Cambridge Platform of 1648, but he does so
in an unconventional manner. Instead of relying on the Word of God alone,
Wise appeals for ecclesiastical democracy by citing the Puritan concept of 
history, New England’s provincial experience, and taking Samuel Pufendorf 
as his "Chief Guide and Spokesman."8 Thus John Wise introduces the 
natural rights theory of continental Europe to New England Puritanism. 
Perry Miller describes Wise’s "shift" from defender of Congregationalism "to 
the champion of laws of reason and nature and to the character of the 
social compact" as "no violent break in the course of New England 
thought."9 John Wise and Samuel Willard are representative figures of New 
England thought in their theology and concepts of human nature.
I
7 Ibid., p. 421.
8 John Wise, A Vindication of the Government of New 
England Churches (1717; reprint, Gainesville, Florida:
Scholar’s Facsimile & Reprint, 1958), p. 32.
9 Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of the Harvard University 
Press, 1956), p. 98.
9In A Comoleat Body of Divinity Samuel Willard defines the nature of a 
creature as "those powers and principles which are put into it, whereby it 
is rendered capable of acting in its own orb." The nature of a reasonable 
creature, a human being, "is that power which it had given it to act as a 
moral agent under a rule," an agent endowed with an "ability of knowing, 
and electing, or chusing and refusing." The actions of the creature are 
those things that are accomplished by the "exertion of that nature or 
principle which is in it; or whatsoever it doth under the influence of its 
reason and will."10 The further description of human nature that Willard 
presents revolves around his fundamental theological beliefs in the fall of 
Adam, and original sin. Therefore much of what Willard ascribes to the 
nature of humans either supports these beliefs by describing the 
unregenerate state of humans or is an explication of regenerate Christians 
who have felt the stirrings of grace.
Concentrating on unregenerate humanity, Willard bases his depiction of 
humankind on secondary theological beliefs that interlock with his primary 
theological tenets. God, the creator of all things, made all things for an 
end, is wise, and "therefore would not make anything in vain." 
Accordingly, God created humans with a nature suited to their end.11 The 
end for which the human being is created is "to Glorify God, and Enjoy 
him for ever." Humans, being distinct from other creatures, were "made 
capable of Happiness: which no other inferior creature can attain unto." 
Happiness consists only in following one’s "Chief End." To follow their end 
and glorify God, humans must seek to live according to God’s will, thus
10 Willard, Body of Divinity, p. 209.
11 Ibid.
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making themselves dependent beings. A "Dependent Being" means that one’s 
felicity is not from oneself—God alone is the "Adequate Object for 
Felicity."12 This "Quest for Happiness" is a principle that is so much a 
part of human nature "that all The Mischief which the Fall hath done" 
cannot deprive humans of this pursuit.13 The fall of Adam made humankind 
"Miserable," but it did not sever the "possibility of being restored to 
Felicity." Unregenerate humans, then, are "not only not Happy, but 
extremely Miserable," for they are "under a Necessity of going abroad" to 
seek happiness.14
The mischief of the Fall and original sin did not deny this "Quest for 
Happiness," but it did make humans "truly and woefully Miserable and 
Wretched." Adam’s sin removed humankind from "that Nearness" to 
happiness; they became "separated" from their end; they have "fallen short 
of the Glory of God, (Rom. 3:23) and [are] removed from the Enjoyment of 
Him (Isai. 59:2)." As a result of the loss of their "Blessedness" Willard 
declares humankind "wretched";15 humans "fell from Life into a state of 
Death." Humans are born "actually miserable"; the recovery from 
wretchedness "is an act of God’s sovereign Pleasure." Here again Willard 
shows the necessity of human reliance upon God. Any reconciliation 
"derives from hence and hath its dependence on God."16 After this brief
12 Ibid., pp. 2, 7.
13 Ibid., p. 7.
14 Ibid., p. 8.
15 Ibid., p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
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outline of his concept of human nature, Willard describes human nature in 
more detail but never outside of this theological context.
An additional component of Willard’s theological context is the "Goodness 
of God" which is available to all human beings. The Goodness of the Lord 
"hath fallen on sinful Man for its subject, and is therefore in a more 
restrained sense called the Mercy of God." God’s mercy or Common 
Goodness is defined as "God willing to succor sinful Man in their Misery." 
God’s mercy is displayed to all, "both good and bad,"17 and is free as well. 
God’s grace, however, is extended to only a few, the predestined. God’s 
grace, along with original sin, the fall of Adam, and subsequent misery of 
humankind, completes a sketch of Willard’s theology.
From his theological context Willard describes the "Special Nature" of 
humans. God created humans but unlike other living creatures God made 
them "Reasonable Living Creature[s]." Human beings were given a "Special 
Nature," whereby "as the head of the Lower World" they were "to direct" 
themselves "and improve the other beings, to the Glory of . . .  , their 
creator." God, creating humans last of all the creatures, endowed them 
with the powers of reason "because otherwise [God] would not have been a 
suitable ruler." Human dominion over the other living creatures "requires 
Wisdom and Discretion." With the ability to reason, humans are "capable of 
guiding them [the other animals] according to the Rules of right Reason."18 
The "Rules of right Reason" will suffice in the temporal world, but reason 
is an unsafe guide in the spiritual world.
17 Ibid., pp. 81, 87.
18 Ibid., pp. 122, 128.
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Accordingly, Willard describes human nature as divided into a body and a 
soul, a motive life and a life of sense.19 Because of the soul’s "Desire 
after Immortality" human beings seek eternal life. The soul is endowed 
with something else as well—the "Facilities of Understanding and Will."20 
The human creature was made "a Moral Agent, a Cause by Counsel," and 
because God gave humans a reasoning ability, they "therefore must have a 
Moral Goodness." This moral goodness "was an Imprinted Goodness or 
Rectitude" that remains even in fallen humanity. Willard concludes that "it 
was then a Stamp and Character of Divine Goodness left upon" human 
nature.21 Unfallen humanity could understand and comprehend "all the 
Intellectual virtues fitting" their ability "to discern, approve of, and
regulate" themselves in "doing the Will of God." Spiritually they could 
discern "all that was needful" of their happiness.22 Reason and the will 
worked together. After the Fall, however, humans lost this discernment
and the two fell out of balance. As a result, reason, which had lost its
moral goodness, became an unreliable guide for the soul.
At the time of creation God implanted in humans a law of "Gubernation" 
along with moral goodness. This natural law is given to all of God’s
creatures, for "God directs and leads the Creatures in the Right Way," to 
the attainment of their end. Willard notes, "there is an Ordering in the 
World," a great chain of being where "all the Actions of all Beings" are
19 Ibid., pp. 119, 123.
20 Ibid., p. 123.
21 Ibid., p. 125.
22 Ibid., p. 126.
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designed by God to serve to some end.23 In a subsequent sermon Willard 
describes an "Order of Superiority" in which children should obey their 
parents, a wife her husband, and a servant its master.24 Willard 
summarizes that "all the Natural Actions of all these Creatures are guided 
by Some rule of Government."25
The rule of government in all creatures becomes the "Law of Nature," and 
is "nothing else but the Impression of God upon the Creature’s Nature." It 
is "an inclination or promptitude natural in the Creature" to act in 
accordance with this law. In other words, it is a "natural Instinct" that is 
"endowed with sense." Because of this the creature is "instigated to put 
forth  noble Acts." This "Law of Nature" in its ultimate form becomes an 
"Obedient Power" wherein the creature is subject to a "passive Obedience to 
the will of the Creator" that entails a "sovereign Pre-determination" of all 
the creature’s actions.26
For the "Reasonable Creature" there is a special government called the 
"Moral Law." Humans, being the reasonable creatures of God’s creation, are 
"capable of chusing their own Actions"; they can "act upon Deliberation, 
and either Elect or Reject." To guide their choosing God provides humans 
with a moral rule. The "Moral Law," as Willard defines it, is a "Divine 
Unchangeable Rule" given to all humankind in accordance with their nature, 
as created by God, that obliges them "to serve to God’s Glory" and attain
23 Ibid., pp. 142-145.
24 Ibid., p. 608.
25 Ibid., p. 145.
26 Ibid., p. 146.
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their "Last End."27 Without this law, the moral actions of humans, "which 
are only truely and properly Humane, would be under no Government, and 
hence they would serve no End." Willard further explains that this law "is 
therefore usually called by Divines, the Law of Nature; not in a larger 
sense respecting the Whole Nature of the Creature, but refrained, relative 
to" human nature.28
In their natural estate human beings "abide under the law as a Covenant" 
and as a "Rule." If they adhere to the terms of the Covenant "they shall 
live, if  otherwise they shall die."29 God gave this law to Adam and meant 
it to be "perpetual." As a result of the Fall, however, humans "lost the 
Sense" of the "Moral Law". A "New edition appeared to Moses on Mount 
Sinai, the Ten Commandments."30 Whatever its form, though, the "Moral 
Law" is a "Special Government" for "Reasonable Creatures," which guides 
them to "a state of Happiness or Misery, according to the Tenour of the 
Moral Law."31
Willard certainly believed that humans had fallen from their primitive 
estate by sinning against God; they fell "from the Rule of God’s 
Government into Misery," but did not fall from their "Obligation of 
Obedience." The "proper Fall" of humankind was from the "Rule of Life 
into Misery,"32 and since the covenant of works was made with Adam, "not
27 Ibid., pp. 149, 565-568.
28 Ibid., p. 150.
29 Ibid., p. 567-568.
30 Ibid., p. 150.
31 Ibid., p. 149.
32 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
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only for himself, but for his Posterity," all of his descendants "by ordinary 
generation sinned in him, and fell with him in his First Transgression."33
The misery into which humankind fell is one of "lost Communion with 
God."34 By virtue of original sin their estate became sinful. In a complete 
explanation, Willard, echoing the Westminster Shorter Catechism, states that 
the estate whereunto humans fell, "consists in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, 
the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, 
which is commonly called original sin; together with all actual 
transgressions which proceed from it." In effect, humans are "born into the 
world under guilt."35
The world they are born into is a world of sin. Sin is the "common 
disease" of humankind, which "the whole race is fallen into" (Rom. 5:12). 
When Adam committed the original sin he forfeited for himself and his 
posterity "all claim to any Goodness, and could expect nothing at God’s 
hands." The only thing that he and humankind could expect was that God’s 
"revenging Justice would fall upon them and cut them off." Adam’s sin put 
humanity "under the Curse of Death, which contains in it a loss of all good 
and a suffering of every evil." Furthermore, it "brought him into a low 
Condition, cast him into a dungeon of distress, a pit of misery, he was laid 
by the Curse as low as Hell itself." Through the offering of grace, 
however, certain of God’s creatures could be drawn "out of this Pit" and 
delivered "from the Lowest Hell."36
33 Ibid., p. 194.
34 Ibid., p. 216.
35 Ibid., p. 205.
36 Ibid., pp. 81, 88.
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Original sin consisted of humans losing sight of their end. At their 
creation humans were "appointed to serve to the Glory of God, by an active 
conformity to the Law of Obedience." The moral rectitude of humans 
depended upon God and humanity abiding unto the law of God. Since 
humans, being moral agents, had moral powers, an inclination to follow the 
moral law, and the ability to do so, their "nature was set right; and this 
was truly" their "righteous-ness and holiness which is therefore said to be 
renewed in conversion."37 In natural, fallen, or unregenerate humans, there 
is a lack of moral rectitude, and by the "contracting of the contrary habit" 
human nature "is swerved from the Law." Properly called, the swerving of 
reason from its rule is original sin. Original sin consists of "the loss of 
original righteousness, or the image of God," and the "corruption of the 
whole nature by the introduction of a contrary image."38
In order to explain the image of God, Willard makes a distinction between 
the natural and moral attributes of humans. Their natural attributes are 
the rational powers of understanding and willing. With the moral attributes 
he makes a further distinction between internal and external moral 
attributes. An external moral attribute is dominion over creatures. 
Internal moral attributes are the habits of grace or holiness infused by God. 
The habits of grace or holiness, "belonged" to the human nature "at 
first."39 Willard asks, is this image of God natural or supernatural? His 
response is that it is "connatural:" the image of God would not belong to
37 Ibid., p. 209.
38 Ibid., p. 210.
39 Ibid.
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human nature, "merely considered as humanity," for if  it did it would mean
that humans would "cease" to be humans "upon the loss of it."40
Through original sin humanity lost the image of God and by so doing
"hath contracted" certain characteristics. The first of these is "an utter
impotency to do that which is truly good." A human "not only doth not do
it, which belongs to actual sin," but "cannot do" good. At one time, before
the Fall, humans could do good, but now all their strength is gone.41
Willard’s second description of humanity after the loss of God’s image
portrays the creature as having "an universal indisposition to that which is
good." In essence humans have lost their desire to serve God’s "Chief
End." As a result, the whole of the human nature is corrupt. Instead of
having the image of God in their nature, humanity has the image of sin,
and from this arises "an utter averseness to that which is spiritually good"
and "a violent propenseness to evil."42
Willard poses the question "What is man?" His response is the following:
he is a creature utterly void of all goodness, and a seminary of all 
manner of abominations. There are not the vilest actions of the worst
sinners, who have been monsters of men, whose actions stand as so
many blots Scripture register, but there are seeds of them all in the 
head of every child of Adam. There is not the least part of any
theological good left in any of his posterity, by nature. There is a
concatenation of all sins in the spawn of them within, a whole old man, 
That hath every lust, as so many members, belonging to it; this is man: 
think of it and be proud if  you can.43
These are harsh words, but they follow faithfully  the Calvinistic tradition
of Willard’s Puritan heritage.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 211.
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Willard’s description of the natural estate of humanity is exhaustive and 
portrays one aspect of the Puritan concept of human nature. Another facet 
of the Puritan concept of human nature emerged from the pen of John 
Wise. Willard’s thought was orthodox Puritanism in its content and 
expression. John Wise, however, rejected the orthodox doctrine of the 
depravity of human nature in favor of a concept of human nature based on 
the natural law theory of Samuel Pufendorf.
In defending the congregational form of church polity, Wise begins A 
Vindication of the Government of New England Churches by stating his 
purpose: "I shall consider man in a state of natural being, as a free-born 
subject under the crown of heaven, and owing homage to none but God 
himself." He continues, "I shall more distinctly explain the state of human 
nature in its original capacity," for humans are put on earth by God, and 
blessed with "many investitures, and immunities which properly belong" to 
humankind.44
The fundamental characteristic, or "the prime immunity," that Wise notes 
in the natural state of humanity is that humans are "most properly the 
subject of the law of nature." Human beings are "the favourite animal on 
earth; in that this part of God’s image, viz. reason is cogenate with [this] 
nature." Through this immutable law of reason and its being a part of the 
human nature "God has provided a rule" for human beings "in all their 
actions" that obliges each to do that which is right, "not merely as to 
justice, but likewise as to all other moral virtues," which is "nothing but 
the dictate of right reason founded in the soul of man."45 Immediately a
44 John Wise, A Vindication, p. 33.
45 Ibid., p. 34.
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distinction can be made between Willard and Wise in the emphasis that each
places on reason. The orthodox content of Willard’s beliefs would not allow
him to put as much trust in reason as Wise did.
The law of nature that humans are subject to is a product of their
reason. As Wise defines the law of nature, it is "that which is to be drawn
from [human] reason, flowing from the true current of that facility, when
unperverted, may be said to be the law of nature, on which account, the
Holy Scriptures declare it written" on the hearts of humanity.46 Wise
qualifies this definition by saying that
when we acknowledge the law of nature to be the dictate of Right 
Reason, we must mean that the Understanding of Man is Endowed with 
such a power, as to be able, from the contemplation of human 
Condition to discover a necessity of living agreeable with this law.47
Wise grounds this in Scripture, "for being endowed with a soul, you may
know from yourself, how, and what you ought to act (Rom. 2:14)." All of
this leads Wise to declare that the nature of humanity is inherently good
and reasonable. He states that although "a principle of self-love and
self-preservation is very predominant" in every human being, they are "also
possessed of a sociable disposition and an affection to live to mankind in
general."48 With respect to human nature, John Wise has removed his
thinking from the rigid orthodoxy of his elders.49
Reason is further emphasized when Wise states that "Reason" and
"Revelation" are "equally" emanations of God’s Wisdom in "hanging out so
46 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
47 Ibid., p. 35.
48 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
49 Clinton L. Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The 
Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), p. 215.
20
many Lights to guide [humans] through a dark World." Wise goes further 
and allows reason to replace revelation—"the light of Reason as a Law and 
Rule of Right is an Effect of Christ’s goodness, care and creating Power, as 
well as of Revelation; though Revelation in Nature’s Law in a fairer and 
brighter Edition."50 In "Nature’s Law" reason is a better guide than 
revelation. Samuel Willard and the Puritan elders could not allow reason to 
supersede divine revelation. To them reason was a fal-lible guide. Wise in 
a bold stroke did the unthinkable—he stated that "Natural Reason is to be 
accounted, Jure Divino, in matters of Religion."51 Wise completely reversed 
the emphasis of Puritan thought from revelation to reason in A Vindication.
Wise notes a "second great immunity" of humanity, "an original liberty" 
stamped upon their rational nature. He explains further that he "shall wave 
the consideration of" humanity’s moral turpitude" and instead view them 
"physically as a creature" of God’s creation that has been given many 
"ennobling immunities." These immunities render the human being "the most 
august animal in the world," and despite the fall of Adam, the human 
"remains at the upper-end of nature, and as such is a creature of a very 
noble character."52 In contrast to Willard, Wise’s characterization of 
human nature focuses on the positive aspects, not the disparaging ones of 
an impudent and evil creature.
The introduction of "an original liberty" by Wise is generally attributed to 
the fact that Wise chose Samuel Pufendorf as his "Chief Guide and 
Spokesman." Pufendorf’s work De Jure Nature et Gentium, first published
50 Wise, A Vindication, pp. 30-32.
51 Ibid., p. 32.
52 Ibid., pp. 34, 37.
21
in Latin in 1672, had been printed in English in 1703 and again in 1710. It 
is possible that Wise read the original Latin, but it is assumed by most 
scholars, since many of Wise’s phrases are adaptations of the 1710 version, 
that he studied Pufendorf after 1710.53 Following Pufendorf’s natural law 
theory, Wise states that the "third capital immunity" which belongs to the 
human nature is an "equality amongst" themselves.54 In subsequent 
paragraphs Wise combines "an original liberty" with an "equality amongst" 
themselves to prove the fundamental goodness of humankind.
The term Wise introduces to show human goodness is "Sociableness." 
Beginning with the statement that human beings in their natural state "must 
be free and at [their] own dispose," Wise further states that they are 
"impelled to enter into a civil community" and divest themselves of their 
"natural freedom," and enter into a compact with their fellow human beings. 
The forming of governments and "yielding" of natural liberty are of 
necessity "to guard" humans against themselves, there being "none so good 
to man, as man, and yet none a greater enemy."55 This reveals Wise’s 
belief in both good and bad motives in humans; if  he had stopped here, it 
would seem that Wise, like Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan, saw life as 
"nasty, poor, brutish, and short."
Wise, however, takes Hobbes* conclusion and transforms it into a belief in 
the goodness of humankind. True, human beings are creatures "desirous" of 
their "own preservation," they are "exposed to many wants," and yet they 
still "are unable to secure" their "own safety and maintenance." Despite
53 Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic, p. 213.
54 Wise, A Vindication, p. 34.
55 Ibid., p. 33.
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these factors that point to human self-interest and brutish ignorance of 
fellow humans, human beings are also "able of returning kindness by the 
furtherance of mutual good."56 In a qualifying argument Wise states that 
human beings are "often found to be malicious, insolent, and easily 
promoted and as powerful in effecting mischief" as they are "ready in 
designing it."57 For such creatures to be preserved "it is necessary" that 
they "be Sociable."58 "Sociableness" is the ability of humans to "unite 
[themselves] to those of [their] own species, and to regulate [themselves] 
towards them, that they may have no fair  reason to harm others but rather 
incline to promote [another’s] interests, and serve [their] rights and 
concerns."59 In summary, "Sociableness" is a "fundamental law of nature, 
that every [human being], to the best of their ability, do maintain a 
sociableness with others, agreeable with the main end and disposition of 
human nature in general." The final conclusion for John Wise, in reference 
to human nature, is that "from the principles of sociableness it follows as a 
fundamental law of nature" that humans are "not so wedded to [their] own 
interest but that [they] can make the common good" their goal.60
At first glance Wise’s "Sociableness" might be mistaken as a divergence 
from the course of Puritan thought, but in actuality, as Perry Miller 
observes, it has a correlation with the covenant theology of earlier
56 Ibid., p. 36.
57 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 37.
60 Ibid.
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Puritanism.61 A component of covenant theology was the promoting of 
certain ends for the good of the faithful; it was a duty commanded by the 
Law of the Gospel. John Wise’s "Sociableness" appropriates this 
fundamental point, but Wise does so from an angle that incorporates natural 
law theory, not merely the Law of the Gospel.
Both Samuel Willard and John Wise were true to their Puritan heritage 
but each in a d ifferent way. Willard defended the orthodox doctrines of 
original sin and human depravity, but he did so in a "systematic exposition" 
that emphasized the rationalist side of the Puritan tradition.62 Like earlier 
Puritan divines, Willard regarded "volitional integrity as essential," yet he 
never lost sight of the strong tradition of piety within Puritanism or its 
orthodox doctrines.63 Willard in this sense foreshadowed the work of men 
like Charles Chauncy, who also held to the rationalist side of the Puritan 
tradition, but Willard more than anyone upheld the orthodox Puritan 
doctrines of his forebears.
John Wise, on the other hand, reached into the future and placed a 
greater emphasis upon the power of reason, an emphasis that would come to 
dominate the intellectual world later in the eighteenth century. Merle 
Curti notes that Wise reflects the transition from Puritanism to the En­
lightenment insofar as he incorporates aspects of both.64 In this sense, 
then, Wise can be described as the Puritan "off-beam."65
61 Miller, Errand, pp. 97-98.
62 Fulcher, "Puritans and Their Passions," p. 137.
63 Ibid.
64 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought.
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), p. 76.
65 Michael McGiffert, personal interview, April 10, 1984.
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In A Comoleat Body of Divinity Willard described human nature as 
wretched. In A Vindication of the Government of the Churches of New
England, more than an ecclesiastical tract and much like the political 
treatises of Revolutionary America, Wise portrayed humanity in the light of 
reason and declared it essentially good. Though reason had once been 
looked upon as a treacherous guide, it had gained an endorsement from a 
Puritan divine, John Wise. Both characterizations of human nature are part 
of the course of New England thought. In conjunction with each other 
they mark out the bounds of intellectual discourse about human nature that 
was to take place in New England after 1720.
"Natural Men in a Dreadful Condition":
Jonathan Edwards
If John Wise’s "Enlightenment" attitudes took Puritanism off course by 
infusing it with concepts of natural rights, Jonathan Edwards wanted to 
return New England to its orthodox Puritan foundations.1 Edwards, colonial 
America’s preeminent philosopher-theologian, not only defended the views of 
orthodox Puritan theology, but incorporated into his concept of human 
nature much that was new. He appropriated the emerging science of Isaac 
Newton and followed the monistic psychology of John Locke. The concept 
of human nature that Edwards created reflects these influences.
The manner in which Edwards described human nature can be discussed 
on two levels. On one level stand Edwards’s metaphysical views about 
human nature; on the other are his scriptural beliefs about humanity. 
Edwards’s metaphysical explanations, when coupled with his scriptural 
beliefs about human nature, are the basis for an anthropology unique in the 
history of New England Puritanism.
Jonathan Edwards’s views about human nature were under-girded by his 
early scientific and philosophical writings. The sermons he preached in 
Northampton (1726-1751) reveal the scriptural basis for his accounts of 
humanity and outline a completely d ifferent aspect of Edwards’s theological
1 See especially Norman Fiering, "Will and Intellect in 
the New England Mind," William and Marv Quarterly 29 (1972):
551-558; James Hoopes "Jonathan Edwards’s Religious Psychol­
ogy," Journal of American History 69 (1983): 849-865.
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anthropology. His published works, Religious Affections. Freedom of the 
Will. Dissertation on the End in Creation. Nature of True Virtue, and 
Original Sin, are examples of the melding together of the two strains of 
thought, the metaphysical and scriptural.2
I
The scientific and philosophic writings, "Of Being," "Of Atoms," and 
"The Mind," provide the foundation for Edwards’s religious psychology. 
These writings also serve to outline his metaphysical ideas. Wallace 
Anderson notes that "Of Atoms" is an example of Edwards’s "metaphysical 
materialism"; "Of Being" and "The Mind" are aspects of his "idealistic 
phenomenalism."3 In order to comprehend the anthropology Edwards forged 
it is necessary to understand his epistemological and metaphysical 
reflections. To discuss Edwards’s anthropology without first looking at his 
metaphysical ideas would be an error, for, as Edwards notes, it is necessary 
that something exist before it can be discussed. Treating Edwards’s ideas 
about humanity developmentally, one finds that the metaphysical reflections 
of these works serve as the foundation from which Edwards constructed a 
more complete concept of human nature.
2 The complete titles of these works are as follows: A 
Treatise Concerning Religious Affections. In Three Parts: A 
Careful and Strict Inquiry into the modern prevailing 
Notions of the Freedom of the Will. Which is supposed to be 
essential to Moral Agency. Virtue and Vice. Reward and 
Punishment. Praise and Blame: Dissertation Concerning the 
End for Which God Created the World: Dissertation on the 
Nature of True Virtue: and The Great Christian Doctrine of 
Original Sin Defended. The short titles used in this 
paragraph will be used elsewhere in this paper.
3 Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific 
and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 53.
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Emerging from the scientific and philosophical writings is Jonathan 
Edwards’s idealism.4 In these works Edwards is beholden to John Locke 
and the Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More.5 Like Locke, Edwards 
distinguished between primary and secondary qualities of bodies. Unlike 
Locke, however, he did not argue for the reality of primary qualities. The 
primary qualities—solidity, extension, figure, and motion—became not 
material existence but merely "resistance," and "resistance," Edwards states, 
is "nothing but the exertion of God’s power."6 All of what is observed by 
human beings that gives them the idea of solidity of bodies is resistance. 
The property of resistance has no substance, yet we know it to exist; it
exists in the mind for there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
object of perception and the perceived idea. Edwards’s idealism, then, rests 
on the supposition that "nothing has existence anywhere else but in 
consciousness,"7 for all "real existence depends on perception."8
Knowledge in this scheme originates in sensation and apprehension by 
the mind. Arising in piecemeal fashion via the senses, knowledge is ordered 
appreciation and reflection; it is definite because it is ordered and 
comprehensible; yet it is limited by its fragmentary character. "Intuition,"
4 See George Rupp, "The ‘Idealism’ of Jonathan 
Edwards," Harvard Theological Review 62 (1969): 209-226.
5 For a discussion of the influence of the Cambridge 
Platonists on Edwards see Ibid., pp. 23-24, 98, 111-112; see 
also Emily Stipes Watts, "Jonathan Edwards and the Cambridge
Platonists," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1963).
6 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 351.
7 Edwards, "Of Being," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 204.
8 Edwards, "Notes on Knowledge and Existence,"
Scientific and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 398.
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a type of knowledge, is an immediate awareness of the objects of sensation. 
For Edwards, intuitive knowledge is not the full content of knowledge but 
it is a self-evident truth such as "the grass is green," that is based on 
immediate sensation.9
Revelation also plays a part in Edwards’s metaphysical explanation. As 
the reservoir of real truth, revelation enters the mind by the "Divine 
Light." The "Divine Light" is an illumination wherein reality is revealed to 
the eye of the soul. This takes place in one instant, is immediate, and 
brings about the fulness of reason.10 Through the senses, or perception of
the aesthetic, the mind perceives the natural world, enters the realm of
intuition or experience, and has finite knowledge. This finite process of 
aesthetic principles, with its finite knowledge, does not provide the 
information that is supplied by the infinite knowledge and beauty of the 
divine and supernatural light of God the creator.11 Through the "Divine 
Light" humans are able in a finite manner to comprehend the infinite
goodness and beauty of the creator. Human knowledge of all things in
Edwards’s metaphysical idealism is finite.
The universe in which humanity lives is a structure of determinate parts, 
ordered and governed by invisible laws. Certain natural laws are 
discoverable by the finite human mind. Edwards’s characterization of the 
universe in this instance relies upon his familiarity with the works of Isaac 
Newton. Jonathan Edwards cited Newton on numerous occasions. In three
9 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical 
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 346.
10 H. G. Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United
States (New York: American Book Co., 1934), p. 43.
11 Ibid.
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of his less known works, "Of Insects,"12 "Things to be Considered,"13 and 
"Of the Rainbow,"14 Edwards refers to Newton’s Optics, on the incurvation 
of rays. And in "The Mind," No. 65, on motion, Edwards’s concept of 
absolute, relative, and absolute circular motion is derived from Newton’s 
Principia.15 Newtonian science influenced Edwards’s scientific writings by 
showing and proving that the universe was governed by laws.16
Edwards’s work in "Of Atoms" evinces one of the invisible laws of of the 
universe, his theory of "atomism." According to Edwards, all bodies "except 
atoms, themselves, must of absolute necessity be composed of atoms, or of 
bodies that are indiscerpible, that cannot be made less." They are held 
together by an infinite  power and cannot "by any infinite power 
whatsoever, be separated one from another."17 The solidity that these 
bodies exhibit is "nothing but resistance to other solidities."18 These solids 
occupy space and resist each other. The space that these bodies occupy
12 Edwards, "Of Insects," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 159.
13 Edwards, "Things to be Considered," Scinetific 
and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 221.
14 Edwards, "Of the Rainbow," Scientific and 
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 298.
15 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 383.
16 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and 
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 41-47.
17 Edwards, "Of Atoms," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 208.
18 Edwards, "Of Being," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 202.
30
operates under the necessary and fixed law that relies upon the "external, 
infinite, and omni-present being," God.19
Edwards’s scientific conception of nature, consisting of atoms, space, 
and resistance, fundamentally grounds itself in the power and wisdom of 
God. Throughout his life Edwards held in awe the "wisdom of God" in 
contriving the whole system.20 Whether he was conscious of it or not, the 
philosopher-scientist of Edwards’s youth, as Wallace Anderson states, 
investigated the world from an avowed "theological setting."21
Another of Edwards’s early works, "Of Being," exhibits two important 
parts of the scientific and philosophic learning of his youth.22 The two 
main claims are that "nothing can be without being known" and that 
"nothing has any existance anywhere else but in consciousness," and 
therefore, does not exist unless it is perceived.23 To exist, the physical 
object must be apprehended by the mind. For Edwards this means that it 
is impossible "that anything should be, and nothing know it," for "those 
beings that have knowledge and consciousness are the only proper and real 
and substantial beings."24
19 Ibid., p. 203.
20 Edwards, "Wisdom in the Contrivance of the World,"
Scientific and Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp.
307-310.
21 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and 
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 49.
22 Ibid., p. 77.
23 Edwards, "Of Being," Scientific and Philosophical 
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 204.
24 Ibid.
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In "The Mind" Edwards continued to be concerned with the "existence of 
bodies and the manner of their dependence upon the mind," rather than as 
the title implies "the existence and nature of minds themselves."25 Edwards 
is initially concerned with excellency in "The Mind" and states "all 
excellency is harmony, symmetry or proportion."26 Being as a result
"consists in relations," a relationship between the real object and the mind
or between two or more objects.27 The truth in general of a relationship
"is the consisting of our ideas with those ideas . . . that are raised in our
minds according to God’s stated order and Law."28 With respect to the 
knowledge of the perceiving mind, Edwards, as Wallace Anderson states, 
"does not suppose that physical objects are merely nominal entities." As 
did Locke, Edwards "holds that bodies have real natures independent of the 
ideas and beliefs we form concerning them."29 With regard to the 
connection between bodies and minds or spirits, the two have distinct 
natures with the mind having a superior ontological status.30
When Edwards wrote "Of Being," he followed the work of Henry More and 
concluded that space is a necessary spiritual being—spirits are extended and
25 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 111.
26 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical 
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 332.
27 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 84.
28 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical 
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 341-342.
29 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 97.
30 Ibid., p. 111.
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do occupy space.31 In "The Mind" a body consists in nothing but the ideas 
of sensation as they are expressed externally and "immediately 
communicated to the mind by God." Anderson further points out that for 
Edwards in "Miscellanie" No. 267, "it appears that a mind itself is nothing 
but various thoughts, perceptions, etc., which are likewise immediately 
produced and sustained by God."32 The identity of the mind, then, depends 
on the essential being, God. Edwards therefore in "The Mind" substantially 
revised his acceptance of Henry More’s "space as necessary being."
In rethinking More’s proposition, Edwards was influenced by John Locke’s 
idea of "consciousness and immediate self-consciousness" as the "marks of 
the mental."33 Edwards conceives of a mind as "nothing but consciousness, 
and what is included in it."34 This consciousness "is to all intents and 
purposes the very same spirit or substance, as much as the same particle of 
matter can be the same with itself at d ifferent times."35 Substance or the 
material world is "absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind." As 
we have seen, the mind’s conceptions depend upon God, for the substance 
of all bodies is "the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in 
God’s mind."36 God’s stable will, the idea in God’s mind, "shall gradually
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 111-113.
33 Ibid., p. 112.
34 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical 
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 342.
35 Ibid., pp. 342-343.
36 Ibid., p. 344.
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be communicated to us, and to other minds” according to the laws of the 
universe.37
Just as the universe and nature are governed by "certain fixed and exact 
established methods and laws," humans, too, have certain fixed dispositions. 
For example, Edwards notes that human beings have an "innate moral 
disposition" that guides their actions.38 Human action requires thought and 
judgment by the mind and the mind must first perceive before it acts; it 
requires knowledge. Not only do we have an innate disposition to guide 
our thought processes before we act, but humans also have a will. In 
Edwards’s psychology and anthropology the will is paramount, for in any 
action by the mind the will is solicited. The will, however, is only one 
component of Edwards’s psychology.
The psychology of Edwards’s forefathers, the faculty or scholastic 
psychology, compartmentalized the faculties of the mind. On one hand, the 
Puritans explained how humans have an intellect which is the king of the 
faculties, also known as the reasonable soul, which is located in the head, 
while on the other hand they described a separate faculty, the queen of the 
faculties, the will, which is found in the heart and is the power of the 
reasonable soul. Edwards rejected the faculty psychology of his Puritan 
forefathers in favor of a monistic psychology.
In Edwards’s thought the will and the inclination to action are one and 
the same: "the will is no otherwise different from inclination, than that we 
commonly call that the will that is the mind’s inclination with respect to
37 Ibid.
38 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 119.
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its own immediate actions.”39 Edwards’s writings on the will in "The Mind" 
set forth  the principles which he explains in detail in Freedom of the Will. 
"The Mind" is important in that it points to further development. It shows 
Edwards "moving away from the traditional concept of will and intellect as 
distinct powers or faculties of the mind, and toward the conception of 
distinct kinds or modes of apprehension of perception of objects."40
For Edwards the relationship between the will and intellect eventually is 
described as being "conjoined in our perception of objects." Through the 
perception of objects the will and intellect, collectively the mind, apprehend 
the relations between the mind and the object. Truth and goodness are not 
discerned by intuition or demonstration by the fallen creature.41 "Truth is 
the agreement of our ideas with existence . . . their consistency with 
themselves." Insofar as Edwards’s whole cosmology is theological truth is 
"an agreement of our ideas with that series in God."42 In scientific 
language Edwards describes the process as one of forming concepts, judging 
objects, and reasoning about the relations between the concept and the 
object. The key term for Edwards is "relations," for knowledge "is not the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but rather the
perception of the union or disunion of ideas, or the perceiving whether two 
or more ideas belong to one another." There is a puzzling aspect to 
"relations" because something may be true yet a mystery—"we cannot
39 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 376.
40 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Scientific and 
Philosophical Writings, vol. 6 of Works, p. 134.
41 Ibid., p. 135.
42 Edwards, "The Mind," Scientific and Philosophical
Writings, vol. 6 of Works, pp. 344-345.
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comprehend, or see the manner how the several ideas that belong to the 
proposition are united. . . . but we may perceive that they are united and 
know that they belong to one another, though we do not know how they 
are tied together."43 The ability to discern relations is one of the laws of 
individual wills and intellects, which it seems varies from person to 
person.44
Edwards in "The Mind," No 67, further explains the workings of the will, 
intellect, understanding, and disposition in a discourse about pleasure and 
pain: "pleasure and pain are not properly ideas" even though they "may 
imply perception in their nature, yet it does not follow that they are 
properly ideas." The mind does act in discerning pleasure and pain, for 
Edwards states that "all acts of the mind about its ideas are not themselves 
mere ideas." This is because "pleasure and pain have their seat in the will, 
and not in the understanding."45 Will and choice are "nothing else but the 
mind’s being pleased with an idea, or having a superior pleasedness in 
something thought of, or a desire of a future thing, or a pleasedness in the 
thought of our union with the thing."46 The understanding at this point in 
Edwards’s thought is not clearly defined. Later in the Religious Affections 
Edwards defines the understanding as the perceiving, speculating, and 
guiding of the soul.
Will, intellect, and understanding are all parts of Edwards’s psychology 
that rests upon his epistemological and metaphysical ideas, which are in
43 Ibid., p. 385.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 384.
46 Ibid.
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turn tied to his theological beliefs. The ideas from which Edwards 
constructs his epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological explanation 
of human beings surface in his scientific and philosophical writings, "Of 
Being," "Of Atoms," and "The Mind." At some points he depends upon the 
work of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, at others his ideas stem from 
John Locke, and at still others he draws upon the work of Isaac Newton. 
In each of these works Edwards scientifically describes phenomena of the 
universe. At each base of explanation, however, lies not a scientific 
explanation but a theological belief that places everything within the realm 
of the omnipresent creator God. The ideas Edwards posited in his 
philosophical and scientific writings continued with him throughout his life. 
At times he revised his thought and presented something new. From these 
writings one would not suspect that the whole of Edwards’s anthropology 
would emphasize the negative aspects of humanity. Metaphysically, 
Edwards’s concept of human nature is void of all of the contempt he 
showered on humanity when describing human nature based on scripture.
II
The biblical view of human nature that Edwards espoused can be 
discovered in some of the sermons of the Northampton period, 1726-1751. 
His ideas about humanity are clear in an examination of nine sermons: "God 
glorified in Man’s Dependence," "Man’s Natural Blindness, in the things of 
Religion," "Men Naturally God’s Enemies," "Justification by Faith Alone," 
"Wicked Men useful in their Destruction only," "Sinners in the hands of an
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Angry God," "A Divine and Supernatural Light . . . "Natural Men in a 
dreadful Condition," and "Wicked Men Inconsistent with themselves."47
Edwards’s first published work was the sermon "God Glorified in Man’s 
Dependence." This sermon was given as the Thursday lecture to the 
ministers of Boston on July 8, 1731. If Perry Miller is correct, this sermon 
served to draw the lines of the battle that continued for the remainder of 
the century between Edwards and his followers, and Charles Chauncy, 
Jonathan Mayhew, and their followers.48 Edwards named I Corinthians 
1:29-31 the text for the sermon and builds upon and expands his belief that 
everyone and everything is wholly dependent upon God. The only good that 
humans have is "in and through Christ: He is made unto us wisdom,
righteousness, sanctification and redemption."49 The only good that the 
fallen and redeemed creature has is concerned with these four things. 
Through the free gift of Christ and the faith  which the Holy Spirit
nourishes in us by Christ, we discern the dependence of the creature upon 
God.
A correlative point in this sermon is that God is glorified in the work of
redemption. Before the Fall, humans cleaved to God for their holiness.
Now, after the fall of Adam and humankind, humans more than ever must 
rely upon God’s arbitrary and sovereign good pleasure. Edwards emphasizes
47 For the full text of these sermons see Jonathan 
Edwards, The Works of President Jonathan Edwards (1808; 
reprint, New York: Leavitt and Allen, 1855), "Worcester 
Edition," vol. 4; idem, The Works of Jonathan Edwards 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1865), "Hickman Edition."
48 See Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (1949; reprint,
Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press,
1981), pp. 23-34.
49 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 62.
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the fact that human beings are helpless; we have a "helplessness in 
ourselves," and "are more apparently dependent on God for holiness, because 
we are first sinful, and utterly polluted, and afterwards holy."50 Though 
humanity is utterly polluted, "we are not only without any true excellency, 
but are full of, and wholly defiled with, that which is infinitely odious," 
and the only good we have comes from God.51 God brings the "sinner from 
his low state" of the total corruption of his nature, "from the depths of sin 
and misery, to such an exalted state of holiness and happiness."52 For 
humans to have saving faith  "it is necessary" that they "should be emptied" 
of themselves and recognize that they are "wretched, and miserable, and 
poor, and blind and naked."53 Edwards’s emphasis is clear. Scripture 
shows that the human creature is in a "low, lost and ruined state" and that 
the creature is "wholly and universally dependent on God."54 From this 
description "it appears that the creature is nothing and that God is all." 
Evident in this sermon is Edwards’s upholding of orthodox Puritanism, the 
fall of humanity, its utter depravity, and its dependence upon God for any 
good whatsoever.
In the sermon "Man’s Natural Blindness, in the things of Religion," 
published posthumously, Edwards speaks about human nature and its 
capacity for religion. With Psalm 94 as the text, Edwards begins by 
showing that vanity is common to all. This leads him to state that in the
50 Ibid., p. 172.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 178.
54 Ibid., pp. 176, 177.
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ways of religion "there is an extreme and brutish blindness" in humans.55 
"This doctrine," he states, "is not to be understood as any reflection on the 
capacity of the human nature; for God hath made man with a noble and 
excellent capacity."56 Humankind is created with certain natural capacities 
and is "capable of true wisdom and divine knowledge."57 There is, 
however, a "blindness" in the heart that is a part of human nature. What 
is the cause of this blindness? Humans are blind not because of a flaw in 
their mental faculties or in their ability to know, but because of a positive 
cause, the Fall. Through the Fall, human nature became corrupted, the 
heart lost its sight and henceforth is prone to delusion. The mind became 
"exceeding dark" and now is as "contrary as possible to reason."58 There is 
a "woeful tendency of the mind of man since the fall, notwithstanding his 
noble powers and faculties; even to sink down into a kind of brutality, to 
lose and extinguish all useful light, and to sink lower and lower into 
darkness."59 Yet, human beings are deceived about their own state. They 
"think themselves something when they are nothing."60 Again Edwards’s 
anthropology rests on a scriptural basis that accentuates the wretched state 
of humanity.
Revelation, an aspect of Edwards’s metaphysical description of humanity, 
is also tied to his biblical view of human nature. In 1733 or 1734 Edwards
55 Ibid., p. 17.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 20.
59 Ibid., p. 22.
60 Ibid., p. 26.
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delivered the sermon "A Divine and Supernatural Light" which is based on 
Matthew 16:17. In defining the exact nature of the divine and supernatural 
light Edwards uses the "via negativa" and tells us what it is not, and by 
doing so he reveals an aspect of human nature. Spiritual light is not "the 
conviction of the sin and misery of natural man," or "an impression made 
on the imagination," or "the suggesting of any new truths or propositions 
not contained in the word of God," nor is it "thought about the things of 
religion."61 The divine and supernatural light is "a real sense and 
apprehension of the divine excellency of things revealed in the word of 
God."62 Human beings, Edwards stresses, by nature have the capacity to 
comprehend this divine emanation. The divine light comes from God, and 
thus we see again that humankind is dependent upon God in the things of 
religion.
Edwards’s emphasis on the dependence of the creature upon God led him 
on a Sunday in July 1734 to name as his text Ezekiel 15:2-4. With "Wicked 
Men Useful in their Destruction Only" Edwards reiterates the creature’s 
dependence upon God in the analogy of the vine. Humanity is "very fitly 
represented by the vine." Just as the vine is weak in comparison to and 
dependent upon "other things which support it," it "well represents to us 
what a poor, feeble, dependent creature man is, and how if left to himself, 
he must fall into mischief, and cannot help himself."63
Another prominent analogy in this sermon is that of the "chain of being." 
Edwards herein shows how humans were given a rational soul to the
61 Ibid., pp. 439-441.
62 Ibid., p. 441.
63 Ibid., p. 300.
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exclusion of the other creatures.64 We are the creature "nearest to God, 
of any in this lower world; and therefore [our] business is with God. Our 
superior end then is to serve and glorify God, while our inferior end shows 
that we were "made for one another," made for our "friends and neighbors, 
and for the good of the public."65 With these statements one can see that 
humans are not totally vile, corrupt, and evil. Is Edwards contradicting 
himself by allowing humans the possibility of doing good? Edwards is not 
contradicting himself, for his explanation of the source of these benevolent 
character-istics is consistent with his fundamental premise that everything 
is dependent upon the Creator. Even though this world is fallen, "and is 
under a curse, and is a miserable place to what it once was," it still has 
"streams of divine goodness."66 The key term is "divine," for the goodness 
is from God and not from humans. The human condition is still inferior.
Edwards explains how far  the natural human condition fell short in the 
sermon "Natural Men in a Dreadful Condition." Choosing Acts 16:29-31 as 
his text, Edwards shows how at one time humans were a "noble piece of 
divine workmanship," but with the Fall they became "dreadfully defaced."67 
He decries the fact that "so excellent a creature . . . should be so 
ruined."68 As in "Man’s. Natural Blindness," so here the "dreadfulness of 
their depravity appears in that humans are sottishly blind and ignorant."69
64 Ibid., p. 301.
65 Ibid., p. 302.
66 Ibid., p. 304.
67 Edwards, Works. "Hickman Edition," p. 817.
68 Ibid.
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God gave humans a faculty of reason and understanding. God "exalted" 
them above all the other creatures, and with that endowment it became 
possible to "know God, and to know spiritual and eternal things."70 After 
the Fall, however, the whole of humanity is debased. Humanity has lost its 
glory with respect to knowing God and has "become as ignorant of the 
excellency of God as the very beasts."71 The human understanding is now 
inundated by darkness. The human mind is blind. We are "ignorant" of 
God, Christ, the way of salvation, and of our own happiness.72 A "spirit of 
atheism" prevails in the hearts of humans.73
Humans are blind and have no goodness because no higher principle than 
self-love exists in their hearts. With nothing but self-love there can be no 
"good exercises of heart, never one good thought or motion of heart in 
them," especially no love to God.74 Besides self-love, the hearts of humans 
are "exceedingly full of sin." The heart is full of lust to a "dreadful 
degree" and is a "mere sink of sin, a fountain of corruption."75 To support 
these charges Edwards quotes Mark 7:21,22. "From within, out of the heart 
of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, 
covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, 
pride, foolishness." In effect, natural humans "are in the image of the
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 818.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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devil."76 Humanity lost the image of God, yet God graciously restrains 
their wickedness, "principally by fear and respect to their credit and 
reputation and by education." And were it not for these restraints, "there 
is no wickedness [humans] would not commit."77 Humans in their natural 
state are unconcerned with the future. From external appearances they 
might look to be "happy in this world," but they are "truly destitute."78 
Humanity is bereft because the only happy creature is one "who is entitled 
to happiness," and the miserable creature is one "who is in danger of 
misery," in their "eternal state." In a natural condition human beings 
cannot be happy for they have no "title to any inheritance in another 
world."79
Justification, which in Edwards’s thought is secured by faith  alone, shows 
that humans can yet be granted the gift of life. Edwards points to Romans 
4:5, which states that "justification respects a man as ungodly." He 
explains how these words imply that God, "in the act of justification has no 
regard to anything in the person justified, as godliness, or any goodness," 
for God looks upon the creature as "ungodly or wicked." Therefore, 
according to Edwards, the natural human prior to justification is abominable 
in the eyes of God. Through God’s gracious act, however, the creature is 
justified.80
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 820.
79 Ibid.
80 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 64-66.
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Until justified, the sinner is under the sway of an infinite guilt "which 
arises from the infinite evil or heinousness of sin." The heinousness of sin 
is a result of forsaking an obligation, the obligation to love or respect any 
being "in proportion to the greatness or excellency of that being."81 
Accordingly, "if a being be infinitely excellent and lovely [i.e., God], our 
obligations to love him are therein infinitely great."82 Because of our 
"infinite comparative meanness" since the Fall, humans can only exercise a 
finite goodness.83 The obligation the creature owes to the infinite creator 
is itself infinite. Human beings, however, can only put their finite being 
into the scales. For Edwards, then, humans are "still infinitely unworthy 
and hateful in God’s sight."84 The infinite sin of the Fall outweighs 
whatever finite goodness natural humanity might have.85
Basing his arguments on scripture, Edwards shows how human beings 
are like "filthy swine" wallowing in the mire of their sins, and that 
justification by fa ith  alone must necessarily come from the infinite God, the 
gracious creator. Edwards, in his biblical view of human nature, continues 
as he did in his metaphysical descriptions to ground his thought in the 
omnipotent creator. In his biblically based anthropology, however, humanity 
could not be characterized as good.
The sermon, "Wicked Men Inconsistent with themselves," contains both 
the metaphysical view and the scripturally based view of humanity. The
81 Ibid., p. 74.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p. 77.
84 Ibid., p. 76.
85 Ibid., p. 131.
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main emphasis of this sermon is to show how wicked humanity is 
inconsistent. Edwards lists several examples of how humans in their natural 
state are inconsistent. First, the understanding of the creature and the 
creature’s end are inconsistent with each other. This does not mean, 
Edwards states emphatically, "that the faculty of reason and understanding 
is inconsistent with itself; for the faculty of understanding with which God 
has endowed man is wholly good and right."86 The inconsistency lies, 
however, in that "the understandings of natural men are perverted by sin" 
and therefore, practical judgment is inconsistent with reason, and hence, 
some judgments do not agree with others.87
A consequence of this first inconsistency is that the human will disagrees 
with its reason, "for the will ever follows the dictate of practical 
judgment."88 This has two inferences. First, humans will those things 
which their reason tells them are inconsistent with their duty, i.e., their 
wills are inconsistent with their consciences. The "conscience," a principle 
implanted in the heart of every human being, is "essential to" their nature 
"as the faculty of reason."89 The wills of sinful humans, acting contrary to 
their consciences, "choose those things which they know to be evil . . . 
that which their own reason tells them is unreasonable and vile."90 The 
divergence between the will and conscience brings forth "an inward war" in
86 Edwards, Works. "Hickman Edition," p. 919.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
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the mind. In the second instance, wicked human beings "will those things 
which their reason tells them are contrary to their own interest."91
Not only is the will at war with the conscience, but it is at odds with 
itself. Edwards characterizes this situation as that of wicked creatures who 
wish to be converted from their sinful ways to the way of God, but who 
are unwilling to part with their sins; their sins they love too well.92 Next, 
he tells how the creature’s "outward show disagrees" with the heart. 
Humans are like wolves in sheep’s clothes, for "many of them profess to 
believe that God is an infinitely excellent being, when indeed they think 
the meanest of their carnal enjoyments is more excellent than God."93 In 
this case the professions of the creatures are not congruent with their 
practice. And likewise, practice disavows their hopes. Sometimes their 
practice is inconsistent with itself as well. For example, some people are 
honest "with respect to strict commutative justice, but they are not 
charitable"—"they are selfish, covetous, close, and unmerciful."94
As if  it were not enough for humans to be inconsistent with themselves, 
Edwards shows how they are also at war with God. In the sermon "Men 
Naturally God’s Enemies," with Psalm 94:8 as text, Edwards repeats the 
dictum that human beings "are or have been sinners," and most of them will 
confess that they have bad hearts.95 Unregenerate humanity has a "very 
mean esteem of God." They have "very low and contemptible thoughts of
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 922.
94 Ibid., p. 925.
95 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 4: 37.
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God."96 As in "Wicked Men Inconsistent with Themselves" the human will 
is contrary to itself. Not only is the natural human’s will at war with 
itself, but it is in opposition to the will of God. In their natural state 
humans are "wholly destitute of any principle of love to God."97 They are 
as destitute of love of God as a "dead, stiff, cold, corpse is of a vital 
heart."98 Again, Edwards states his belief in the natural human principle 
of atheism. Then, returning to his fundamental premise of the sovereignty 
of God, Edwards shows that humans "cannot overcome their own enmity"; 
they never strive to do so.99 The only way to overcome this absence of 
love is through the gracious act of God.
Edwards’s most famous sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," 
preached on the eve of the Great Awakening, takes as its text Deuteronomy 
32:35, "Their foot shall slide in due time." This sermon portrays humanity 
at its worst, and it is sad that most people who know of Jonathan Edwards 
know of him only through this sermon, for statements about Edwards’s 
theology or anthropology based on this sermon are only an attenuated view 
of Edwards. One cannot deny the power of this tract or the vivid images 
it promotes. God is portrayed as vengeful and sometimes wrathful: God 
"holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some 
loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his
96 Ibid., p. 38.
97 Ibid., p. 40.
98 Ibid.
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wrath towards you burns like fire, he looks upon you as worthy of nothing 
else, but to be cast into the fire."100
In "Sinners" Edwards tells how humans are a "burden to the earth." 
They are such a burden that "the creation groans," and God looks upon 
them as worth nothing but to be cast into hell.101 These statements are in 
accord with everything we have discussed in Edwards’s other sermons. In 
comparison with the infinite beauty of God, the natural human is an ugly 
creature.
The biblical view of humanity that Edwards presented in his sermons, like 
his metaphysical anthropology, rests upon his fundamental belief in the 
sovereignty of God. Humanity in this theological anthropology is debased in 
every respect. Human beings are like "filthy worms" with their only good 
derived from the all powerful creator, God.
Ill
Edwards’s published treatises, Religious Affections. Freedom of the 
Will. Dissertation on the End in Creation. Nature of True Virtue, and 
Original Sin, bring together his metaphysical and scriptural views of 
humanity, sometimes even in the same essay. These works outline the
extent to which he reflected upon the human condition.
Religious Affections, published in 1746, constitutes Edwards’s apologetic 
for the emotional upheaval of the Great Awakening. In the Religious 
Affections Edwards continues the line of argumentation he set forth in 
Distinguishing Marks and Thoughts on the Revival. The main question in
100 Ibid., p. 318.
101 Ibid., p. 317.
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these works is "how shall the presence of the divine Spirit be 
discerned?"102 Many, including Charles Chauncy, had denounced the Great 
Awakening and the revivals as spurious expressions of piety. Edwards 
himself questioned the genuineness of some of the affections produced by 
the revivals, but never did he think that the Great Awakening was not the 
work of God.
Fundamentally, the problem for Edwards became "what are the 
distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God, and 
entitled to his eternal rewards?" In other words, "what is the nature of 
true religion?"103 To answer these questions Edwards investigated the 
nature of the affections. He sought to explain what were true and false 
religious affections. Part and parcel of this explanation for Edwards were 
the questions what causes the affections, what is their relationship to the 
divine Spirit, and also in what manner are the affections "connected" to the 
understanding and will.104
To define the nature of true religion Edwards begins with Scripture, for 
he quotes I Peter 1:8, "Whom having not seen, ye love: in whom though 
now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full 
of glory." In his exegesis of I Peter, Edwards states that true religion 
"consists in holy affections," a love and joy in Jesus Christ. The affections
102 Jo n a th an  Edwards, "Editor’s In troduction,"  
Religious Affections, vol. 2 of The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1.
103 Edwards, "Author’s Preface," Religious Affections. 
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of joy in Christ manifest itself through spiritual insight, are unseen, and 
are the f ru it  of fa ith .105
What is the nature of these affections? The affec-tions, Edwards 
answers, "are no other, than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of 
the inclination and will of the soul."106 They are lively enough to go 
beyond indifference, to the point where "the motion of the blood and 
animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered," whereupon some change occurs 
in the heart.107 True religion and its affections alter the internal sense of 
the creature. For Edwards, the affections ultimately indicate the direction 
of the soul, either towards God or the world. The natural human’s 
affections are concerned with this world while the affections of the saint 
are focused on the divine Spirit.
Both the natural and saintly humans have affections that are the "sensible 
exercises" of the will and inclination of the soul. The soul is the unifying 
force in Edwards’s psychology, and as in "The Mind," the soul is "indued" 
with two faculties: the understanding and the will.108
John E. Smith, editor of Religious Affections, in the Yale edition of 
Edwards’s Works, stresses that Edwards continued to follow the points he 
outlined in "The Mind." Regarding the two faculties, the will and
105 Edwards, Religious Affections, vol. 2 of Works, p.
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understanding, Edwards, though he made distinctions, nonetheless argued for 
a unifying psychology.109
The origins of Edwards’s unifying psychology can be found in the 
thought of John Locke. Locke argued against the scholastic psychology 
that held that the faculties were distinct agents and form a psychology of 
the mind wherein the will and understanding are two powers, not distinct 
faculties. Edwards used Locke as his source but went beyond him and 
abolished any differentiation between the powers of the mind. The powers 
of the mind for Edwards, however, were not indistinguishable. What this 
means is that the will and understanding could not oppose each other.110 
This stand by Edwards is in direct opposition to the position taken by some 
of his Puritan predecessors, who emphasized the distinctions between the 
will and understanding in their faculty psychology.111
If Edwards’s only reason for writing the Affections had been to show 
the nature of the affections, he would have ended with Part One, the 
psychological description of the human creature. Edwards, however, was 
also concerned with showing how true religion consists in the affections. 
God, the author of the human nature, not only indued the human creation 
with affections, "but has made ’em very much the spring of men’s 
actions."112 And "the affections do not only necessarily belong to the
109 Edw ards, "Editor’s Introduction," Religious 
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human nature, but are a very great part of it; so . . . holy affections do 
not only necessarily belong to true religion, but are a very great part of 
that.1'113 Therefore, "as true religion is of a practical nature, and God has 
so constituted the human nature, that the affections are very much the 
spring of men’s actions, this also shows, that true religion must consist 
very much in the affections."114 We see that the human creature would be 
inactive, "any otherwise than he is influenced by some affection, either love 
or hatred, desire, hope, fear or some other."115 Take these away "and the 
world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead; there would be no 
such thing as activity amongst mankind, or any earnest pursuit 
whatsoever."116 Consequently, Edwards declares that religion is one of the 
fundamental aspects of human nature.117 There is, however, always the 
difference between the natural and religious affections, between natural and 
regenerate humans.
The distinction made between the natural and saintly human is analogous 
to the difference between the terms describing the natural and moral 
attributes in humans. In Part III of the Religious Affections Edwards 
summarizes the essence of these terms and their meaning. Humans can 
conceive of two kinds of attributes in God "which are summed up in his 
holiness and . . . natural attributes, of strength, knowledge, etc. that
113 Ibid., p. 101.
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constitute the greatness of God."118 Similarly, there is a corresponding 
twofold "imago Dei" in humans: God’s "moral or spiritual image, which is his 
holiness, that is the image of God’s moral excellency (which image was lost 
by the Fall); and God’s natural image, consisting in men’s reason and 
understanding, his natural ability, and dominion over the creatures, which is 
the image of God’s natural attributes."119 This twofold distinction echoes 
the work of William Ames and continues to reinforce Edwards’s general 
supposition of the differences between the natural and regenerate human 
and between God and humans. Edwards in the Religious Affections 
defended the Great Awakening on the basis of his scriptural views within 
the context of his metaphysics. The treatise on the affections shows how 
Edwards’s psychological and theological views came together to form a 
unified concept of human nature.
In Freedom of the Will, published in 1754 after he left Northampton, 
Edwards continued to base his arguments and anthropology on a synthesis 
of his metaphysical, psychological, biblical, and theological views. Freedom 
of the Will, like the Religious Affections, is an apologetic tract. Edwards 
states in the conclusion that Freedom of the Will "obviate[s] some of the 
chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the total 
depravity and corruption of man’s nature."120 The Arminians rejected this 
doctrine, which holds that the human heart is "wholly under the power of 
sin," making one "utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign 
grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do anything that is truly
118 Ibid., p. 256.
119 Ibid.
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good and acceptable in God’s sight," for they felt "it is incon-sistent with 
the freedom of man’s will, consisting in indifference and self-determining 
power."121 They believed that this doctrine makes human beings "no more 
than mere machines."122 They in turn advocated a theory of contin-gency 
which Edwards rejected because it gave too much power to the human 
creature.123 The theological issue for Edwards, according to Paul Ramsey, 
was that "either contingency and the liberty of self-determination must be 
run out of this world, or God will be shut out."124
Edwards’s argument against the Arminian notions of contingency as the 
basis of the freedom of the will rests upon two foundations, the proof from 
Scripture and the proof from reason.125 The major portion of Edwards’s 
tract consists of philosophical and semantic proofs defending his notion of 
the freedom of the will. What Edwards proved on the basis of scripture 
reinforces what he had said else-where.
Many times Edwards chides the Arminians for their imprecise use of 
language. In Part I he begins by defining his terms. What is the nature of 
the will, he asks. "I observe," he states, "that the will . . .  is plainly, that
121 Ibid.
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by which the mind chooses anything."126 From thence Edwards proceeds 
through the philosophical argument.
To clarify the discussion, Edwards defines the term "liberty." Freedom or 
liberty is "power, opportunity, or advantage" to do as one pleases.127 
Freedom of the will means simply acts of volition wherein one is "free from 
hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any 
respect."128 In other words, a human being is free to do what he or she 
wills but not to do what he or she does not will. Therefore, in any act of 
volition the mind or inclination is pleased with one thing rather than 
another.129
How does the will choose? In explaining the will and its processes 
Edwards states that the human will "always is as the greatest apparent 
good, or as what appears most agreeable, is."130 He says this rather than 
the greatest apparent good determines the will or that what seems most 
agreeable does. He does so "because an appearing most agreeable or 
pleasing to the mind, and the mind’s preferring or choosing, seem hardly to 
be properly and perfectly distinct."131 What then determines the will? 
Initially, Edwards states that the will is always determined by the strongest 
motive.132 He later qualifies this statement with "or by that view of the
126 Edwards, Freedom of the Will, vol. 1 of Works, p. 137.
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mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite 
volition."133 The will determines an act by willing and choosing. Humans 
have the ability to choose as they please under this explanation.134
The Arminians, however, could not see how the Calvinist doctrines 
allowed this capacity. They felt that Calvinism bound the will and that it 
therefore could not be held accountable. Edwards denies the Arminian 
objection and shows that the will is worthy of praise and blame.
Building upon his explanation of the connection between the will and 
any action going forth  from it, Edwards states that "when a thing is from a 
man, . . . that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because 
his will is in i t : so fa r  is the will in it . blame is in it . and no further."135 
Human actions are subject to moral and ethical judgment "not so properly 
because they are from us, as because we are in them. . . . not so much 
because they are from some property of ours, as because they are our 
properties."136 Actions are a property of the human nature guided by the 
soul and the will. For the "soul of virtue and vice," praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness is "a certain beauty or deformity that [is] inherent in that 
good or evil will."137
If moral accountability relies upon an inherent attribute, then is the will 
independent and self-moved as the Arminians believed? Edwards replies 
with an emphatic no. Paul Ramsey points out that causation is the central
133 Ibid.
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focus of Freedom of the Will.138 Edwards defines causation as "that 
whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a cause why it 
then begins to exist."139 Inherent in this explanation is Edwards’s 
refutation of the Arminian notion of the self-determined will. Edwards 
"can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul’s having power 
to cause and determine its own volitions, as a being to whom God has 
given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul, 
sometimes at least, to excite volitions at its pleasure or accord as it 
chooses."140
Another point of Freedom of the Will that is relevant to Edwards’s 
anthropology concerns the refutation of the Arminian notion of freedom and 
liberty. The Arminian position is clear to Edwards: the more the soul has 
"disengagedness in its actings, the more liberty"; the more liberty, the 
greater the disinterestedness, and if the soul has perfect liberty, then, as 
Edwards points out, it is completely disengaged and cannot be held 
responsible.141 Here Edwards turns the table on the Arminians, who 
themselves objected to the Calvinist doctrines for not allowing room for 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. If humans do not will according to 
the dictates of reason, the agreeableness of the good to them, and from 
their own dispositions and characters, it is not choice that determines their 
actions but "it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising
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from nothing in him."142 Therefore, according to Edwards, the Arminian 
notion of freedom is not freedom at all, for if  freedom is only 
contingency, humans could not be praised or blamed for their actions. 
Contingency is anathema to Edwards, for there is an "universal sense" of 
humankind that there is sincerity of virtue only in "actions which proceed 
from a heart well disposed and inclined," and the greater the virtue "the 
stronger, and more fixed and determined the good disposition of the 
heart."143 Fundamentally, Edwards argues for the freedom of the will and 
in turn the freedom of the person with respect to its act of volition. 
These acts are worthy of praise or blame because they are properties of 
the human nature. Accordingly, virtue is a "quality of mind."144 The 
amount of virtue a person has is in direct proportion to the inherent 
disposition of the mind.
Edwards probes deeper into the subject of virtue in the second essay of a 
two-essay work. In the first essay, entitled Dissertation Concerning the 
End for which God Created the World. Edwards deals, as the title suggests, 
with the reasons for God’s creating the world. The second essay, The 
Nature of True Virtue, focuses on the human side and expounds Edwards’s 
form of Calvinism, Christian ethics, and understanding of the New 
Testament commandment of love.145
142 Ibid., p. 326.
143 Ibid., p. 321.
144 Ibid., p. 325.
145 Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, 
foreword by William K. Frankena (1765) (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. viii.
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The Nature of True Virtue, written in 1755 but not published until 1765, 
seven years after Edwards’s death, focuses on the virtue of the human 
creature. Edwards’s fundamental supposition rests not in reason but in 
sentiment. Moral judgments, virtue, and vice find approval or disapproval 
in the sentiments among humankind. The "sensible" notion that Edwards 
introduces in the sermon "God Glorified in Man’s Dependence" resurfaces. 
Edwards identifies sense in the human realm with a sense of beauty, i.e., a 
sense wherein pleasure is immediately perceived from the objects of 
perception. Virtue in this instance reflects a type of beauty, a beauty of 
the heart.146
There are two kinds of beauty: beauty of disposition and beauty of 
action, and there are two corresponding senses by which they are relished. 
Primary beauty, the highest, true, spiritual and divine beauty, consists of 
benevolence or love of Being in general. Only a spiritual or divine sense 
relishes this type of beauty. The secondary, infe-rior, or natural beauty, 
perceived by a "fleshy" natural sense, reveals itself in harmony, proportion, 
and uniformity.147
Because virtue corresponds to beauty there are two types of virtue: virtue 
and true virtue. True virtue consists in primary beauty. It is consent and 
good will to Being in general. In other words, Edwards explains true virtue 
to be "love of intelligent Being in general," for "beings that have no 
perception or will . . . are not properly capable objects of benevolence."148 
Virtue concerns itself with intelligent beings loving in proportion to their
146 Ibid., pp. viii, ix.
147 Ibid.
148 Edwards, Works. "Worcester Edition," 2: 263.
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dignity, their degree of existence, and the extent to which they love Being 
as Being.149 "To speak more accurately," Edwards states, "it is that
consent, propensity and union of heart to being in general which is
immediately exercised in a general good will."150 Because God is infinite, 
both in dignity and existence, then true virtue is essentially love of God, 
"the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best."151 True virtue in 
humans consists of benevolence to being in general, and benevolence to
virtuous being. Therefore, any human being with true virtue "must
necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and
complacence."152
The natural creature does not have this divine sense. Humans, the
inferior creatures, have a notion of a form of excellence but not true
virtue. Biasically, humans inherently rely on a sense of justice, which is no 
more than "a relish of uniformity and proportion" that involves no true 
virtue. This sense of justice combines common morality with a love of 
consistency and reflects the conscience of each human. A sense of justice 
does not have its roots in love to Being in general but lies in "an
inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves," and therefore reflects 
not true virtue but self-love.153
Humans, however, Edwards points out, have a "moral sense that is natural
149 Edwards, True Virtue, p. 3.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p. 14.
152 Ibid., p. 15.
153 Ibid., pp. x, xi.
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to all."154 This moral sense "consists in a natural relish of the beauty of
true virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by
nature in the hearts of all."155 They also have a natural conscience which
consists of two parts: a "disposition to approve or disprove" and "a natural
agreement, proportion and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and
resentment and punishment."156 Through the workings of the natural
conscience humans are able to discern and "will approve of true virtue and
condemn the want of it, and opposition to it."157 If the human conscience
is "fully enlightened, . . . delivered from being confined to a private sphere,
and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from
being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day
of judgment, they will approve nothing but true virtue."158
The general nature of true virtue is love. It is love to Being in general,
a love of God. In his introduction to The Great Christian Doctrine of
Original Sin Defended. Clyde A. Holbrook summarizes Edwards’s depiction of
the human relationship to true virtue:
A truly virtuous deed involves the heart of man, his inclination to 
savor the divine riches, but the heart can have no tendency to make it 
self better, till it begins to have a better tendency. And this is 
precisely the essential factor in true virtue, which is quite beyond the 
capacity of the self to achieve.159
154 Ibid., p. 52.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., p. 65.
157 Ibid., p. 69.
158 Ibid.
159 Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original 
Sin, vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970), p. 37.
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Underlying these words about the human capacity for true virtue is 
Edwards’s defense of the doctrine of original sin and the depravity of the 
human nature.
Original Sin, published in 1758, the year Edwards died, completes 
Edwards’s theological anthropology. The controversy over the precise 
essence of the human nature, whether depraved or not, is much too complex 
to recount the vicissitudes of the argument that preceded Edwards.160 
Suffice it to say that the doctrine of original sin defaced the image of 
humanity that the Enlightenment in the clear light of reason developed. 
Edwards stepped into the battle as defender of the "hated doctrine," the 
champion of an orthodox dogma that was being attacked in Europe, 
England, and America in the eighteenth century.161
Edwards wrote chiefly in opposition to John Taylor’s The 
Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin. Proposed to Free and Candid 
Examination.162 Edwards’s defense rests upon three pillars: first, that all 
humans, throughout all time and ages "without fail in any one instance, run 
into that moral evil, which is in effect their own utter and eternal 
perdition"; second, the explication of this fact lies in and was precipitated 
by the fall of Adam; and third, that God, though sovereign in all things, 
could not be charged with being the author of human depravity.163 
Edwards propounds these positions on original sin solely in terms of the
160 For a full discussion please see H. Shelton Smith,
Changing Conceptions of Original Sin: A Study in American 
Theology Since 1750 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955).
161 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original Sin. 
vol. 3 of Works, p. 1.
162 Ibid., p. 3.
163 Ibid., p. 26.
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natural human without the interposition of divine grace. He implied that 
his opponents spoke about the human creation which had received divine 
grace. From Edwards’s standpoint, however, scripture and human 
experience taught that humankind is depraved and that humanity flourishes 
in its baseness.164
The plight of the human condition, sin, inaugurated by Adam, is a 
function of membership "in a history of human conduct."165 In Original Sin 
Edwards develops a "historical notion of human nature in which it is the 
history of the race that assumes a unified metaphysical identity."166 In 
Edwards’s history, humans originally possessed two sets of principles: the 
inferior, natural principle of mere human nature, which is self-love, and the 
superior, divine principle, being the spiritual image of God. Both are 
necessary for the happiness of the human nature. Before the fall of Adam, 
humans had a supernatural sense, but when Adam sinned the divine 
principles were withdrawn. The inferior principles consequently became the 
reigning principles and self-love now dominates.167 Humans share with 
Adam an inclination or a principle of human action that conveys a moral 
responsibility.168 Humankind sinned in Adam and continues in its 
transgressions. Humanity fell short of the moral law given by God, and,
164 Ibid., p. 30.
165 David Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees, 
and the Problem of Solidarity." Harvard Theological Review 
67 (1974): 175.
166 Ibid., p. 157.
167 Thomas A. Schafer, "The Concept of Being in the 
Thought of Jonathan Edwards" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
1951), p. 244.
168 Ibid., p. 174.
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therefore, human beings fail to possess a "relish" and "taste" for the divine 
and supernatural things.169
The human condition subsists in "moral depravity." Evil and pernicious is 
the state of human nature.170 For the natural state of the human mind is 
"attended with a propensity of nature" to sin.171 Therefore, humanity is 
"corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity, that amounts to and implies 
their utter undoing."172 Edwards cites scripture: I Kings 8:46, Ecclesiastes 
7:20, and Job 9:2-3 and concludes that every human being who is capable of 
acting as a moral agent is guilty of sin.173 Then he calls upon 
Deuteronomy 3:22 and Galatians 3:10 to support the claim that sin is 
universal.174 The propensity of all humankind to sin belongs to their 
nature because sin is observed in humankind in general.175 Humankind 
exists "naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this 
consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt 
and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast 
wholly out of the favour of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and
169 Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original Sin, 
vol. 3 of Works, p. 36.
170 Edwards, Original Sin, vol. 3 of Works, p. 109.
171 Ibid., p. 120.
172 Ibid., p. 113.
173 Ibid., p. 114.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., p. 125.
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curse," death.176 The "universal reign of death" proves the sinful nature of 
all humans.177
But is it human nature to sin? Edwards explains,
If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper 
place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it 
is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not 
good in its place in the system: and those inherent qualities of that 
part of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are 
not justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is 
truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent 
in it, that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered 
together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, 
whether that propensity be good or bad.178
Humankind then, is evil in its natural state, yet Edwards finds goodness 
in the human creature as well. One of the objections raised to the 
doctrine of original sin is that it "pours contempt upon the human nature." 
Edwards’s response states that "no contempt is by this doctrine cast upon 
the noble faculties and capacities of man’s nature, or the exalted business, 
and divine and immortal happiness he is made capable of."179 The key 
words in this passage are the last three, "made capable of." Despite all of 
the evil characteristics of human nature there exists a flicker of divine 
goodness.
Edwards’s anthropology, comprising his metaphysical and scriptural ideas 
about human nature, stresses the negative characteristics of human beings.
176 Ibid., p. 119.
177 Ibid., p. 206.
178 Ibid., p. 125.
179 Ibid., p. 423.
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If looked at by themselves, however, Edwards’s metaphysical ideas would 
not lead one to conclude that humanity is base. How does one square this 
positive outlook with the negative conception of humanity that emerges 
from his anthropology based on scripture? First and foremost, Edwards’s 
metaphysical and biblical ideas about humanity are not opposing viewpoints. 
That one is positive and the other negative does not mean that they 
conflict. The epistemological and metaphysical explanations Edwards posits 
fall into line with his scriptural beliefs. For at the center of Edwards’s 
world rests a theological belief in the sovereignty of God. Fundamentally, 
his ideas, be they epistemological, metaphysical, or scriptural, all return to 
this premise. It was characteristic of a Puritan to theologically declare 
humans impotent, while at the same time to admit psychologically that 
humankind was quite capable of doing the good. In this sense Edwards was 
a true Puritan.
As Samuel Willard and John Wise are examples of the Puritan 
anthropologies of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century New 
England, Jonathan Edwards emerges in the mid-eighteenth century as a 
defender of orthodox Puritanism. His metaphysical view of humankind, 
however, goes beyond earlier Puritan views in its adoption of Newtonian 
science and Lockean psychology. The biblical aspect of his anthropology is 
entirely orthodox. Though he denies the label of "Calvinist" in Freedom of 
the Will. Edwards defends the main tenets of Calvin, for he subscribes to 
the orthodox doctrines of divine sovereignty, original sin, and total 
depravity. The fact that his anthropology is orthodox, while at the same 
time incorporating the new science and psychology of the eighteenth 
century, makes Jonathan Edwards’s anthropology unique.
The Benevolence of the Deity:
Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy
While Jonathan Edwards is best described as one who attempts to 
re-ground New England in orthodox Puritanism, Charles Chauncy and 
Jonathan Mayhew, following in the tradition of John Wise, embraced the 
Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason and questioned the orthodoxy of their 
forebears.
I
Jonathan Mayhew, minister of West Church in Boston from 1747 to 
1766, explicated an anthropology that emphasizes the rational strain of 
Puritanism. The concept of human nature that is apparent in Mayhew’s 
sermons describes human beings as innately neither good nor evil but 
endowed unequally with the capacity of reason.
Whereas the theology and anthropology of Edwards revolves around the 
fundamental precept of the sovereignty of God, Mayhew’s theology, centers 
on the goodness of God. Mayhew states that the benevolence of the 
creator is the focus of Christian revelation and that any description of a 
wrathful God was improper. Mayhew’s description of creation depicts God’s 
acts as rational. These acts are comprehen-sible by the human mind and 
they disclose the goodness of God. The implications of this are twofold: 
first, humans can know the nature of God through the works of God, i.e., 
on the basis of what exists in nature human beings can discern the essence
67
68
of God without the assistance of revelation; second, this world in turn is 
the best of all possible worlds.1 Mayhew’s belief in the goodness of God 
stands in stark contrast to Edwards’s defense of the orthodox Puritan view 
of a God of divine sovereignty. This fundamental difference led each to 
espouse contrasting anthropologies.
Mayhew’s insistence on God’s goodness led him to preach a gospel that 
flatly rejected the orthodox doctrine of native depravity.2 Instead of 
preaching orthodox Puritan doctrine, he preached a gospel of "supernatural 
rationalism" and individualism.3 He expounded a liberal, natural, and 
rational religion. Therefore, the doctrines of original sin, innate depravity, 
and predestination are not the focus of the thought of Mayhew. Though 
Mayhew abhorred orthodox Puritan doctrine, he in essence remained a true 
Puritan because he detested prelatic institutions and was versed in scripture 
enough to follow in the footsteps of traditional Puritan piety.4
James Jones in The Shattered Synthesis claims that John Norton opened 
the door for the humanism that Mayhew preached and that as a result "in 
Mayhew the Ramist tradition, and all of Puritanism with it, degenerates into 
moralism."5 The support for such an argument lies in Mayhew’s theological
1 James Jones, The Shattered Synthesis: New England 
Puritanism Before the Great Awakening (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973), pp. 145-146.
2 H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original 
Sin: A Study in American Theology Since 1750 (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), p. 22.
3 John A. Corrigan, "Religion and the Social Theories 
of Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew." (Ph.D. diss.
University of Chicago, 1982), p. 12.
4 Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 77-78.
5 Jones, The Shattered Synthesis, p. 160.
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assertion of the benevolence of God. Mayhew correlated the manifestation 
of God’s goodness with the belief that its intent was to make human beings 
happy. Consequently, this is the best of all possible worlds. This world of 
natural and moral spheres in which humans live is "under the same common 
direction or government." God’s end in this and all things, "however 
various and diverse, is really one and uniform." The end of God’s creation 
is "the moral perfection and happiness of the creatures capable of it, or the 
glory of God; which in any good and intelligent sense, seems to amount to 
the same thing."6
Jonathan Edwards’s answer to the question, what is the end of humankind 
and the end of creation seems at first glance, at least semantically, to be 
the same as Mayhew’s answer: the glory of God and God’s goodness. A 
closer comparison reveals a paradigmatic difference. Edwards’s 
understanding of the glory and goodness of God is only manifest as the 
happiness of the human creature insofar as it is the happiness of God, and 
if God’s supreme end, God’s own pleasure, is to make humankind happy, 
then so be it. But the chief end of God, according to Jonathan Edwards, is 
not the happiness of humanity. The supreme difference between the 
theology and anthropology of these two Puritan divines rests in their world 
views. Edwards subscribed to a theocentric world view wherein God is the 
center and focus of everything; Mayhew advocated an anthropocentric 
concept that placed humankind in an elevated position wherein God can be 
described as responding to human desires.
6 Jonathan Mayhew, The Expected Dissolution of All 
Things. A Motive to Universal Holiness (Boston: Edes & Gill 
and R. Draper, 1755), p. 59.
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A question that arises with either explanation is how does one explain 
evil in the world? Some of Edwards opponents pointed out that a 
theocentric theology and anthropology would make God the author of human 
sin and depravity. Edwards flatly rejected this notion. God is not the 
active author of sin. Sin is not the result of a "positive influence" by God 
nor is it "infused" into human nature.7 God merely permits sin to enter 
this world and humankind to be depraved. Mayhew’s response to a question 
about the nature of evil is to return to his precept of the goodness of God 
and the consequent happiness for human beings. Human beings in their 
present state "actually need trials and afflictions, as a means of promoting 
their moral good, and future happiness."8 Evil, then, exists for the good of 
humanity.
Mayhew’s belief in the goodness of God made it impossible for him to 
accept the doctrines of original sin, innate depravity, and predestination. 
"If any persons really hold such a doctrine," Mayhew asks, how can they 
"reconcile [it] with the goodness of God?"9 This doctrine is "most false 
and unscriptural, horrible to the last degree, to all men of an undepraved 
judgment, and blasphemous against the God of heaven and earth." It is 
impossible for anyone "who really believes what the Scriptures teach 
concerning the goodness of God even to think" of these doctrines "but with
7 For a more complete discussion of this topic see 
Jonathan Edwards, "Editor’s Introduction," Original Sin, 
vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), pp. 41-64; H. Shelton Smith,
Changing Conceptions. Chap. 1.
8 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Sermons on the Nature. Extent
and Perfection of the Divine Goodness (Boston: D & J 
Kneeland, 1763), p. 58.
9 Ibid., p. 66.
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great indignation."10 Mayhew’s insistence on the goodness of God led him 
to disavow these fundamental Puritan doctrines and instead profess an 
anthropology that is d ifferent from that of Edwards. Edwards described 
humankind as depraved; Mayhew could not do so.
The theology of Mayhew, if pursued further with respect to salvation, 
reveals its anthropocentric character. Mayhew espoused a governmental 
theory of atonement and a theory of salvation wherein human creatures 
save themselves. Their sins are atoned for and they are assured of their 
salvation through obedience to the commands of Christ. Mayhew described 
humans as being the active authors of their own salvation.11 For Edwards 
and orthodox Puritanism this was anathema—sinners could not be saved by 
any initiation of their own. Human beings are active in orthodox Puritan 
theology but only in the sense that they respond to the stirrings of grace 
that God imparts to them.
In Seven Sermons . . . Preached as a Lecture in the West Meeting 
House (1750), Mayhew’s first published work, he made clear that he 
abhorred the doctrine of natural depravity and disagreed with the orthodox 
theories of atonement and salvation. One reason Mayhew dissented from 
orthodox opinion was because it did not allow for the natural capacities of 
the human being, specifically, the ability of all human beings to discern the 
tru th  of a proposition by means of natural reason. Humans are able to 
perceive the "natural" difference between right and wrong because "truth 
and moral rectitude are things fixed, stable and uniform; having their
10 Ibid.
11 Jones, The Shattered Synthesis, pp. 153-154.
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foundation in the nature of things."12 Through their rational nature and 
free will Mayhew depicts humans as having the ability to choose one 
proposition over another.
Right and wrong, truth and moral rectitude are fixed and stable 
propositions that exist in this world. The world in which humans live is 
God’s world. God upholds, rules, controls it and, "in some way or other, 
perhaps inconceivable by us, actually orders and determines the events of 
it."13 The origin of all events is God’s will. God’s will, the purposefulness 
of nature, is coterminous with the harmony, coherence, and consistence of 
the universe. The plan God has for the world, however, is not always 
comprehensible by the human understanding. God’s works at times can be 
so "marvelous" that "we cannot penetrate into, or fully comprehend them, 
by reason of the narrowness of our faculties . . . and it is but a little way 
that we can see into the nature and causes and reasons of things."14 It is 
"infinitely absurd to imagine" that humans with "such limited capacities . . . 
should be able to fully comprehend the immense designs and works of an 
infin ite  being."15 This explanation upholds the abilities of human beings as 
they exist within the realm of God’s world.
Mayhew’s statement about the "circumstances and events" of life reflects 
his world view which made the most of human capacities while still
12 Jonathan Mayhew, Seven Sermons (Boston: Rogers and 
Fowle, 1749), p. 18.
13 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered November 
23d 1758 (Boston: Draper, for Edes & Gill and Green &
Russell, 1758), pp. 36-37.
14 Jonathan Mayhew, A Discourse on Revelation XV. 3d.
4th (Boston: Edes & Gill and R. Draper, 1755), pp. 22-23.
15 Mayhew, Expected Dissolution, p. 28.
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assenting to the dominion of God. The events of life, he states, "must be 
ascribed at last to that divine providence, which superintends and 
over-rules all things."16 The popular analogy that Mayhew resorts to is 
"the fabulous golden chain of the poets." This golden chain is "hung down 
from heaven to earth; the upper end whereof is far  above mortal reach and 
sight, and there fastened to the throne of God."17 God in this schema 
governs the moral good and evil of the natural world. The insight of the 
human creature, being finite, "cannot see into the connections and 
dependences of things and events in the moral world."18 Yet, humans "do, 
or may know so much, both of him and them, as may serve the ends of 
practical religion; which is the end of man."19 Since practical religion is 
the end for human beings, they "have a religious sense" of God’s "wisdom, 
power and goodness, and of the obligations which we are under."20 Human 
beings have the ability to discern their place in the universe.
The human understanding "holds the same rank in the order of beings" as 
does the body in the material universe. And the only knowledge that 
human beings can attain reflects the middling position that humans hold 
between God and the brute creatures. Human beings are endowed with a 
faculty of reason that the brute creatures do not have, but humans do not 
have the complete reason of God. Knowledge in Mayhew’s psychology 
allows humans to "discern somewhat of the middle of things, under an
16 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered October 
9th 1760 (Boston: n.p., 1760), p. 19.
17 Ibid.
18 Mayhew, Discourse on Revelation, p. 30.
19 Ibid., p. 32.
20 Ibid., p. 59.
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eternal Despair of comprehending either their Beginning or the End.*' This 
middle state of knowledge is a condition that describes all human 
faculties--"our senses can bear no extremes, too much noise or too much 
light are equally fatal; and make us deaf or blind: Too great Distance or 
too great nearness do alike hinder a Prospect and etc." Such is the proper 
place of the human creature that "confines all our Attainments within 
certain limits we can never pass."21
The human method of reasoning also reflects the middling position. 
Essentially, Mayhew depicts reasoning as keeping an open mind. It is 
important to let the mind "lie in equilibrio" in order for one to judge 
"solely by reason and argument."22 The "Sobriety of the mind," this 
"medium," corresponds to the Puritan sense of the dialectical. It is founded 
in a belief in God’s being and perfection, moral governance, and universal 
providence. In other words, it is agreeable to natural reason and expresses 
the revelations of Holy Scripture.23 This dialectic between scripture and 
natural reason is not a contradiction since each confirms and helps to 
illustrate the other. Mayhew’s use of the dialectic between biblical truths 
and natural reason is a manifestation of his Puritan heritage.
Like every orthodox Puritan, Jonathan Mayhew adhered to the idea of 
justification by faith. However, he was not content with "faith" as it was 
expressed by some of his forebears. Mayhew advocated faith  in the one 
and supreme God. He supported an expanded meaning of faith  that included
21 The information in this paragraph is from the Mayhew 
Papers, Boston University, Folder 10, pp. 6-7, as found in 
Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 141.
22 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 42.
23 Jonathan Mayhew, Christian Sobriety (Boston: R. & S.
Draper, 1763), p. 50.
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acts of repentance and obedience that the Christian performs as faith  
increased.24 To an extent the contrast between faith  and works seems to 
be lost. Mayhew speaks of fa ith  and works as mutually dependent upon 
each other, for "the necessity of the former arises only from the necessity 
of the latter." Works in Mayhew’s theology are pronounced as being 
"whatsoever is necessary, in order to our being at peace with God." Faith 
in turn is merely the "uprightness of heart" or a freedom from habitual 
sinning.25 This follows upon Mayhew’s explanation of knowledge and 
reason both within a mutually concerned dialectic wherein the human aspect 
is fitly  represented as the middle ground.
Jonathan Mayhew, in the tradition of the Puritan propensity for the 
dialectical, upheld the dialectic between good and evil in the soul of human 
beings, but the emphasis was different. In Seven Sermons Mayhew’s 
thought is divided into three distinct propositions: 1) that there exists a 
distinct natural difference between right and wrong, good and evil, 2) that 
human beings, endowed with certain faculties, e.g., reason and 
understanding, can judge and discern the difference between right and 
wrong, and 3) that humans are obliged to exert these faculties and to judge 
for themselves.26 A corollary to the third point is that all Christians 
should read the Bible and judge for themselves in matters of religion.
A question arises in Mayhew’s mind when the difference between right 
and wrong is described as being clearly distinct: why do some human beings 
choose wrong; why do they choose to do evil? As did Edwards, Mayhew
24 Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 147.
25 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, pp. 109, 215, 327.
26 Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 150.
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answers that the difficulty  lies in the fact that "in some cases" it is hard 
"to determine the boundaries." Sometimes things are "so intricate and 
complicated, that it is difficult, or even impossible, to determine them."27 
The world in this system of thought then, can be both good and evil and so 
it is—"But alas! there is never any great good in this present evil world 
without some mixture of evil, at least if what seems to us to be so."28 
This leads to a further question, one which Mayhew did not address. If a 
theology is centered on or backed by the goodness of the creator God and 
this is the best of all possible worlds because the end of God and humanity 
is then happiness, why is the present world evil? Mayhew could have 
answered this question as Charles Chauncy did, that the world fell with 
Adam and that sin now abounds, but he simply did not address the issue. 
The inherent nature of humanity can be maintained as in the way of the 
middle ground, neither good nor evil, by asserting that we are not born 
morally depraved but with an imperfect nature. Yet, what are the 
implications when one asserts a theology of salvation, as Mayhew does, 
wherein the sinner saves his or her own life? What would this mean to an 
orthodox Puritan such as Jonathan Edwards, John Cotton, or Samuel 
Willard? The implications of Mayhew’s theology as a result of a subtle 
change in emphasis in the dialectic between good and evil are that the 
world is no longer Godcentered but human-centered. The world view is no 
longer theocentric; it is anthropocentric, for the emphasis lies on the 
happiness of humanity.
27 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, pp. 13, 16.
28 Jonathan Mayhew, Two Thanksgiving Discourses 
(Boston: R. Draper, 1759), p. 63.
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Mayhew’s advocacy of a dialectic of the middle ground between good and 
evil and between faith  and works can also be seen in his description of the 
Great Awakening. The reason and the affections, the head and the heart, 
were out of balance, according to Mayhew. He felt that the revivals placed 
too much importance upon the affections. Though Mayhew joined the great 
debate over the significance of the revivals only nominally he still referred 
to the "vain Enthusiasts" as "enlightened Ideots" who "endeavour to palm 
the grossest absurdities upon their neighbours, under the notion of their 
being divine truths and holy mysteries."29
Mayhew then offers a paean to reason: "It is by our reason that we 
are exalted above the beasts of the field. It is by this that we are allied
to angels, and all the glorious intelligence of the heavenly world; yea, by
this we resemble God himself."30 Mayhew’s sympathies clearly lay with 
reason but only in so far as to return the things of religion to a state of
equilibrium. The affections had upset the balance between the heart and
head in the things of religion.
The source for Jonathan Mayhew’s middle ground was his subscription to 
the faculty psychology of Puritanism. Mayhew’s psychology grounded in the 
distinct faculties of the soul holds that "the Heart has its Arguments and 
motives, with which the Reason is not acquainted." The heart, according to 
Mayhew, and not the reason contains the "perception of God."31 The 
affections in turn are the proper seat of religious thankfulness. Religious
29 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 39.
30 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
31 The information in this paragraph is from the Mayhew 
Papers, Boston University, Folder 10, pp. 7-8, as quoted by 
Corrigan, "Social Theories," p. 153.
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thankfulness is d ifferent from "the mere sensation of joy or account of the
blessing received." It is also distinguished from "a mere speculative notion
in the head, and all the operations of that which is peculiarly and strictly
called, the intellectual or rational faculty."32 What is religion and from
where does it arise, the heart or the reason?
Religion is a passion and passions are from God, but it is a passion
"excited by reason presenting the proper object of it to the mind." With
the experience of the Great Awakening present in his thoughts Mayhew
returns to his idea of the middle ground and explains how religion is really
a mixture of the heart and the reason. We ought not to
be so solicitous about avoiding one extreme, as to fall into the contrary. 
We ought not to run so far  from enthusiasm, as to lose sight of real 
direction; we ought not to be so fond of a rational religion, as to 
suppose that religion consists wholly in cold, dry speculation, without 
having any concern for the affections.33
Religion, according to Mayhew, requires both the heart and the reason to
be in balance.
To claim that Mayhew advocated reason over the heart and the affections 
would be incorrect. Reason, however, does play an increasingly important 
role in Jonathan Mayhew’s theology and anthropology. Mayhew read the 
works of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Bishop Benjamin Hoadley and pointed out 
the place of reason in a world that he felt had forsaken reason. He did 
not preach a gospel that appealed to and excited one’s affections; he would 
not dangle his parishioners over the fire pit of hell. Mayhew noted the 
fact that human beings are "certainly weak, indigent creatures" and that 
indeed humans are "in some degree conscious of their own imperfection,"
32 Mayhew, Two Discourses Delivered November 23d 1758.
p. 41.
33 Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 95.
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but he assured his congregation that they could distinguish between right 
and wrong with their own faculty of reason.34 Humans are weak and 
ignorant on one hand, but on the other they are also quite capable of 
goodness. More often than not Mayhew emphasizes the essential goodness 
of human nature. Mayhew’s sermons reflect this fact in that he attempted 
to persuade his parishioners by appealing to their reason in setting concrete 
examples of fact before them. For instance, he set ominous natural events 
such as earthquakes and fires before them as a means of persuading the 
human reason rather than exciting the affections. Earthquakes and fires 
were proof of the power of God and were "indeed very peculiarly adapted 
to rouse and awaken the minds of the inconsiderate, and if  those who 
forget God; and to beget in them that fear him, which is the beginning of 
wisdom."35
Jonathan Mayhew thus espoused a d ifferent anthropology from that of 
Edwards. Edwards believed in the innate depravity of humankind and 
showed how humans could not do anything for their salvation, while 
Mayhew argued against an innate depravity of humanity and stressed the 
goodness of the human in reference to reason. In Mayhew’s eyes human 
beings are essentially good and, if they would follow their reason, they 
might combine fa ith  with works to earn their salvation. Absent from the 
anthropology of Jonathan Mayhew is the theocentric world view that 
Jonathan Edwards proclaimed.
34 Jonathan Mayhew, A Sermon preached at Boston in New 
England. Mav 26. 1751. Occasioned bv the much-lamented death 
of His Roval Highness Frederick. Prince of Wales (Boston: R.
Draper and D. Gookin, 1751), p. 5; Smith, Changing Concep­
tions. p. 25.
35 Mayhew, Discourse on Revelation, p. 51.
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II
Similar to the anthropology of Mayhew is that of Charles Chauncy. 
Chauncy, like Mayhew combined the human-istic ideas of the eighteenth 
century with Puritanism and, like Mayhew, placed emphasis on the human 
faculty of reason. Both men based their theologies on the idea of the 
benevo-lence of the deity. Chauncy affirmed "supernatural ration-alism" as 
did Mayhew, but Chauncy would abhor the title in favor of being labeled 
simply a good Congregationalism36 Charles Chauncy, perhaps the most 
important cleric in Boston during the mid- to late-eighteenth century,
published more than Mayhew.
The theology of Charles Chauncy, based on the assertion of the
benevolence of the deity, is best expressed in his "Body of Divinity." As 
Bezaleel Howard defines it, Chauncy’s "Body of Divinity" consists of The 
Benevolence of the Deitv (1784), Five Dissertations on the Scripture 
Account of the Fall (1785), and Salvation for All Men (1784). Chauncy
began work on these essays in early 1752, and the project was completed
seven years later.37
The fundamental work to the whole "Body of Divinity" is The Benevolence 
of the Deitv. Benevolence is "a principle disposing and prompting to the 
communication of happi-ness."38 Conrad Wright, in The Beginnings of 
Unitarianism. notes that - Chauncy, in defining benevolence, "took great
36 Edward M. G riffin , Old Brick. Charles Chauncv of 
Boston: 1705-1787 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1980), p. 4.
37 Ibid., p. 109.
38 Charles Chauncy, The Benevolence of the Deitv 
(Boston: Powars and Willis, 1784), p. 11.
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pains" to insist "that the word has exactly the same meaning when ascribed 
to God as when applied" to humans. Chauncy in this instance was arguing 
against the high Calvinist notion of a gulf between God and humans.39 
Chauncy states that "Every Being, in heaven and earth, to whom this 
attribute may be applied, partakes of the same Quality, though not in the 
same manner, nor in the same degree and proportion."40 Divine 
benevolence is "analogous to kind affection" in humans, but "only as kind 
affection in us is attended with frailty." In God "it is absolutely perfect" 
in both mode and manner of exercise. Benevolence in the deity explicitly 
denotes the same thing with a "disposition freely to communicate all the 
good that is consistent with wise and fit conduct." God, the benevolent 
deity, "knows all the ways of producing happiness."41
Human beings in The Benevolence of the Deitv are portrayed as 
intelligent moral agents who have the "ability and freedom to Will, as well 
as to do."42 They have mental and moral capacities of perfection and 
happiness that depend upon themselves. As in Mayhew’s universe, humans, 
for Chauncy, occupy a middling position between God and the brute 
creature. Human beings are "partly animal and partly rational, being allied 
both to the highest, and the lowest orders of being in the universe."43 
The "chain of being," an idea found in many Puritan theologies such as 
those of Perkins, Ames, Edwards, and Mayhew, reappears again in Chauncy’s
39 Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in 
America (Boston: Starr King Press, 1955), p. 171-172.
40 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. p. 14.
41 Ibid., pp. 18, 38-39.
42 Ibid., title page.
43 Ibid., pp. 62, 86.
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thought. Humans within Chauncy’s chain of being constitute "one person"
or "living agent." The human constitution, formed by God is an "illustrious
instance of the Divine goodness. Because of this, humans are able to
"conceive of the Deitv as absolutely and perfectly benevolent."44
The ability to discern the benevolence of the deity is not the only mental
capacity humans have. There are two others that Chauncy describes
humans as having. The first "furnishes us with the materials of knowledge;
the other qualifies us for the proper use of them."45 The materials of
knowledge are furnished by sensation. Sensation "is that capacity by means
of which impression from without become perceptions w ithin." These
impressions affect the mind and give rise to sensible ideas. Reflection
qualifies the proper use of the ideas of sensation and includes the mind’s
capacity for introspection.46
Knowledge in Chauncy’s psychology reflects the two mental capacities of
sensation and reflection.
Knowledge is an assent grounded on the perception of the bodily 
senses, or the operation of our reasonable powers. External objects 
strike our senses, and we at once know what impressions we receive 
from them. And we have an ability of mind to reason upon things, 
comparing them together, deducing consequences from them, forming a
judgment how far this or that is true or false, and giving or
with-holding our assent accordingly.47
Chauncy’s psychology is Lockean in one sense because knowledge is gained
through the senses, but it is scholastic in its insistence on the division of
44 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
45 Ibid., p. 97.
46 Ibid.
47 Charles Chauncy, Twelve Sermons On the following
seasonable and important Subjects (Boston: D. & J. Kneeland,
1765), pp. 71-72.
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the faculties. The capacities and faculties of the mind are separate in 
Chauncy’s psychology just as they are in the faculty psychology of earlier 
Puritans. The unifying sense of Locke’s psychology did not have the same 
impact on Charles Chauncy that it did on Jonathan Edwards.
Besides having a mental faculty and mental capacities, humans are also 
endowed with a moral faculty. Moral knowledge, "a new sort of 
knowledge," is non-material and concerns the moral world. The attributes
of the human moral faculty reside in their moral sense, their ability of
self-determination, and their conscience. The moral sense, implanted by 
God, enables humans at once "to distinguish between moral good, moral 
evil."48 Self-determination is the human capacity to attain happiness for 
themselves, and the conscience is a witness to testify for or against us.49 
All of these attributes are derived from God, the benevolent deity.
Reflecting upon the moral world allows humans to "perceive a difference of 
powers in [their] own constitution, some superior, others inferior." 
Becoming acquainted with these powers and the governance thereof consists 
in a "moral economy" which is humankind’s "greatest glory."50
The constitution of human beings, being both material and moral, 
intellectual and moral, and rational and sensi-ble, "evidently carries with it 
the marks of benevolence." Human nature therefore is "adorned and
endowed" wonderfully with a "supreme and perfect goodness."51 These 
powers, intellectual and moral, however, are not fully developed. Human
48 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. p. 120.
49 Ibid., pp. 120, 144.
50 Ibid., p. 106
51 Ibid., p. 107.
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beings are born with weak and feeble intellectual powers and only "in a 
slow and leisurely way, under due cultivation, and in the use of labor and 
oain." do "they gain strength, and advance to any considerable degrees of 
their attainable perfection." Every human is born capable of "attaining still 
higher degrees." This progression towards perfection "is the most natural 
and rational one that could have been contrived."52 Human beings depend 
upon themselves in Chauncy’s schema, for humans can only attain to 
perfection by their own endeavors.
The moral sense of the human nature, implanted by God, allows for an 
easy distinction between moral good and moral evil. There are points, 
however, where it is hard to discern the difference. Mayhew felt that at 
points the line between good and evil became blurred and therein some 
chose wrongly. Chauncy considered both sides of the issue of good and 
evil like Mayhew did, but he pushed for a greater connection between the 
opposing sides of the dialectical struggle in the soul. In Benevolence of 
the Deitv Chauncy denies that good and evil are two opposite and 
independent principles. Good and evil are connected; humans just cannot 
see how. The connection "surpasses our ability particularly to trace the 
ways wherein it may tend to good."53 This points out Chauncy’s insistence 
on the coherency and consistency of creation and allowed him to state that 
evil can be good. Evil is not a theological problem; it is a human problem. 
Evil and suffering occur in this world as a trial: "the proper tendency and
52 Ibid., p. 113.
53 Ibid., p. 179.
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final cause of evils and suffering . . . are to do us good, in the natural and 
moral sense, or both. They are a suitably adapted mean to this end."54
The only basis of moral obligation for Chauncy is the ability of
self-determination. Human beings "are at liberty to will or not to will, to
chuse or not to chuse, the doing of these and those actions." As free 
agents endowed by God it is the human nature that constitutes them as 
free. Free agency is "the grand supporting pillar of the world, considered 
as moral" and the author is God.55
The self-determination of the will argument that Chauncy puts forth 
stands in direct contrast to that of Jonathan Edwards in Freedom of the 
Will. Edwards rejected the Arminian notions of Chauncy and others because 
they put too much power into the hands of human beings—they shut God 
out of the world. Edwards denied the self-determination of the will. 
Chauncy, however, felt the will had a power of self-determination and that 
this free agency rests in the benevolence of the deity in endowing human 
nature with such. This difference between Chauncy and Edwards over
self-determination points to the fundamental difference in their
anthropologies. Edwards discussed the issues in terms of Locke’s unifying 
psychology, while Chauncy spoke in terms of the faculty psychology, and as 
a result they disagreed. The debate between Edwards and Chauncy went 
beyond the psycho-logical realm, into the theological arena.
One of the theological disagreements between Edwards and Chauncy 
centers around the fall of Adam and the subsequent innate depravity of
54 Charles Chauncy, The Mvsterv Hid from All Ages. Made 
Manifest bv the Gospel Revelation (London: C. Dilly, 1784), 
p. 324.
55 Chauncy, Benevolence of the Deitv. pp. 128, 132, 135.
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humankind. Edwards defended the orthodox doctrine of Puritanism, the
depravity of humankind. Jonathan Mayhew denied the depravity of
humankind and so did Charles Chauncy.
A  more shocking idea can scarcely be given of the Deitv.than that 
which represents him as arbi-trarily dooming the greater part of the 
race of men to eternal misery. Was he wholly destitute of goodness, 
vea. positively malevolent in his nature, a worse representation could 
not be well made of him. And vet, this is the true import of the 
doctrine of absolute and unconditional repro-bation, as it has been 
taught, even bv those who profess faith  in God as a benevolent, vea. 
an infinitely benevolent Being.56
The result of Chauncy’s belief in the benevolence of the deity is an
anthropology that could not assert that humans were inherently evil.
Chauncy asserts in dissertation one of Five Dissertations on the Scripture
Account of the Fall: and its consequences that human beings are created in
the image of God. What he means is that humans have "naked capacities"
and by using these humans can attain unto perfection. Human beings have
the "capacity" for God’s likeness.57 Just as there is a progression towards
perfection of the intellectual and moral powers there is a corresponding
progression in the spiritual and religious abilities of humans. These beliefs
led Chauncy, like Mayhew, to affirm  the connection between fa ith  and
works. Chauncy states "instead of denying faith  to be a work. I avow it
to be one."58 The connection between faith  and works is expressed as a
"duty" and it is every human being’s "duty" to strive for perfection in
things spiritual. In Chauncy’s mind, how could humans be depraved if  they
could attain unto perfection?
56 Ibid., p. viii.
57 Charles Chauncy, Five Dissertations on the Scrip­
ture Account of the Fall (London: n.p., 1785), p. 23.
58 Chauncy, Twelve Sermons, p. 121.
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Chauncy’s argument against the orthodox doctrine of innate depravity also 
focused on a rejection of imputed sin and Jonathan Edwards’s "one complex 
person," Adam.59 Adam was not formed in a state of moral perfection as 
the Calvinists held but was created, Chauncy states, "with nothing more 
than those capacities which are proper to a being of that order in which he 
was created."60 God "endowed" Adam with "naked capacities" which would 
enable him to "attain to that perfection in resembling the Deity he was 
originally formed and designed for."61 Adam, however, broke his covenant 
with God. Adam’s forsaking the covenant resulted in two types of evil in 
this world: 1) natural evil such as physical death, fear, shame, and a sense 
of guilt, and 2) judicial evil which required labor, sorrow, and suffering 
that eventually ends with the loss of life.62 Adam’s posterity, however, 
according to Chauncy, did not participate in his sin. Human beings are not 
guilty of the original sin, but "the human race descends from Adam in his 
lapsed state" and as a result humanity inherits mortality.63 Chauncy
therefore asserted that humanity is not innately depraved.
If humanity is not depraved, then why do sin and evil persist? Chauncy 
answers this question by pointing out the personal rather than the
corporate nature of sin. Sin is "a moral irregularity" that "stands in
necessary connection with the agent who commits it, and must therefore, in
59 Smith, Changing Conceptions, p. 53.
60 Chauncy, Five Dissertations, p. 23.
61 Ibid.
62 Smith, Changing Conceptions, p. 52; Chauncy, Five
Dissertations, pp. 108-112.
63 Chauncy, Five Dissertations, p. 129.
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the nature of things, be Personal.”64 Human beings suffer in Adam’s sin 
and death, but they are not guilty of it. Chauncy denies the interpretation 
of I Corinthians that holds that humankind comes into existence as morally 
corrupt. Adam’s sin is "merely the instrument or medium . . . through 
which God communicated" the human nature. Humans cannot be inherently 
sinful or depraved because there is no agency involved. They are born 
mortal and imperfect, according to Chauncy, but not depraved or sinful. 
Human beings in Chauncy’s eyes are nothing but "corruptible mortal 
creatures by nature.”65
Charles Chauncy, as Edward G riffin  describes him, felt that "by insisting" 
upon the depravity of human nature the evangelical New Lights of the 
Great Awakening "influenced the people to define themselves as unworthy 
of the great task before them." The task that Chauncy saw before the 
colonists was that of being a "redeemer nation." Chauncy believed that, by 
using only their unaided reason, human beings could discern the basics of 
religion: the existence of God, the necessity of religion, and the existence 
of a fu ture  life that held forth reward or punishment.66 In the full scope 
of things, however, reason also needed the affections. During the Great 
Awakening the question became, how much of the revivals is the working of 
God? Because Chauncy consistently affirmed the benevolence of the deity 
and because he affirm ed God’s justice, we have two distinct answers. Did 
the revivals rely too much upon the affections at the expense of reason? 
Chauncy, like Mayhew, thought they did.
64 Ibid., p. 131.
65 Ibid., p. 132.
66 G riffin , Old Brick, pp. 4-5.
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Jonathan Edwards through his preaching initiated the revivals that grew 
into the Great Awakening. Consequently, he defended the revivals as the 
work of God. At one point the enthusiasm exceeded the limits of 
Edwards’s approval, and in the Religious Affections he noted the excesses 
of the revivals and qualified God’s role in the stirrings of grace that were 
rampant throughout New England. The excesses of the revivals were the 
results of the corruption of human-kind. Chauncy, on the other hand, 
though he never stated that the revivals were not the work of God, felt 
the revivals were not wonderful or glorious instances of the workings of 
God. Too much disorder, doctrinal error, and enthusiasm prevailed. The 
errors of the revivals were not the result of the corruption of humankind 
for Chauncy, but they were the effects of itinerant preachers and a 
preaching style that appealed to the affections.67
The differences between Chauncy and Edwards can be condensed into a 
disagreement over the workings of the Spirit and opposing theories of 
psychology. Edwards, as defender of the revivals, upheld the affections and 
their efficacy in the things of religion and never denied the powers of 
reason of the human mind. Charles Chauncy never rejected the importance 
of the affections, but he felt that things had gone awry in the Great 
Awakening. In Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New 
England. Chauncy states that "an enlightened Mind, and not raised 
Affections, ought always to be the Guide of those who call themselves Men; 
and this, in the Affairs of Religion, as well as other Things."68
67 Ibid., pp. 79-85.
68 Charles Chauncy, Seasonable Thoughts on the State of
Religion in New England (Boston: Rogers and Fowle, 1743), p.
327.
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Chauncy’s psychology rests upon his ideas about the universe, its 
hierarchical arrangement, and its chain of being. The human being was 
organized in a like manner. The capacities of humans were ordered, 
ascending from the lower bodily functions to the highest faculties of the 
mind, willing and reasoning. The affections in Chauncy’s system of thought 
reside below the faculty of reason. With religion the importance lay in 
keeping a balance between the reason and the affections. The "heart" 
might influence the "head," for the "passions, when suitably mov’d, tend 
rightly to awaken the reasonable powers, and put them on a lively and 
vigorous exercise." The obverse could take place as well; humans could be 
struck by the beauty of creation and its amiability and then be moved to 
love God. The problem with the Great Awakening, according to Chauncy, 
lay in its unbalanced nature: the affections swayed the balance. For 
Chauncy the affections needed to be balanced with the understanding 
because fundamentally, the higher powers govern; an "Enlightened Mind" 
guides the "raised Affections."
The anthropology that emerges from the thought of Chauncy, similar to 
that of Mayhew, begins and ends with the theological assertion of the 
benevolence of the deity and revolves around an outdated faculty 
psychology that emphasizes the faculty of reason. Chauncy’s anthropology, 
anthropocentric in character, when coupled with that of Mayhew, stands in 
contrast to the concepts of human nature espoused earlier in New England’s 
history.
Conclusion
Samuel Willard, John Wise, Jonathan Edwards, Jonathan Mayhew, and 
Charles Chauncy, New England divines, left sermons and treatises that 
disclose their thoughts about human nature. The concepts of human nature 
that are found in their works reveal much about how they viewed life. 
When taken as a whole, these concepts point to and reinforce the thesis of 
change in New England from 1676 to 1776. Many factors were involved in 
this transformation, and many scholars have aptly demonstrated the 
economic, political, intellectual, religious, and social changes that occurred 
in eighteenth-century New England.
Merle Curti, in Human Nature in American Thought, describes the 
emergence in America during the eighteenth century of an anthropocentric 
world view from the theocentric bastion of orthodox Puritanism. The thesis 
of this essay is the same: that in the one hundred years before the 
American Revolution the concept of human nature in New England changed. 
The emergence of an anthropocentric theological anthropology in the minds 
of such men as Chauncy and Mayhew is not something which has gone 
undiscovered, and Curti was not the first to advance the notion that 
religious thought in America went from being almost singularly theocentric 
to rather anthropocentric in the eighteenth century. There are many 
reasons for the appearance of anthropocentric concepts of human nature 
during these years. It has not, however, been the objective of this thesis 
to answer questions about causation. This essay merely discovers the
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"what," the substance of the change in the theological anthropology of New 
England.
The theocentric foundation for most concepts of human nature in the 
seventeenth century eroded in the eighteenth but did not fall into ruin as 
an anthropocentric alternative emerged. From the eighteenth century to 
the present, these two world views have opposed each other for control of 
the religious mind in America. The concepts of human nature that Willard, 
Wise, Edwards, Mayhew, and Chauncy espoused rested on one or the other 
of these two foundations or world views, and each of these figures 
represents a significant aspect of what became an ever-expanding argument 
in American religious thought.
Willard’s concept of human nature as depraved reflects the theocentric 
foundation of his orthodox heritage. John Wise, drawing upon the natural 
rights theory of Samuel Pufendorf, rejected this view. Wise represents the 
early phase of the Enlightenment in New England thought wherein a 
universe infused with Reason could not support a Calvinist concept of 
human nature. Rather than opting for the theo-centric world view of 
Willard, Wise chose an anthropocentric world view that focused upon the 
right reason of human beings.
Jonathan Edwards represents Puritan orthodoxy in the mid-eighteenth 
century. Edwards’s concept of human nature, theocentric in its foundation, 
emphasizes the depravity of humanity as well as the native abilities of 
humankind. Perry Miller, in describing seventeenth-century Puritan 
psychology and anthropology, noted how Puritans could declare humanity 
depraved but at the same time capable of many noble achievements. 
Edwards fits this description well. The scripturally-based writings of 
Edwards reveal a concept of human nature as depraved, while his scientific
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and philosophical writings portray humans as noble creatures. It may 
appear that Edwards’s thought about human nature is contradictory, but it 
is not. Edwards’s anthropology is clearly theocentric in character, for his 
scriptural, scientific, and philosophical writings are based on a belief that 
everything depends upon God.
The anthropology of Jonathan Edwards stands in contrast to the 
anthropologies of Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew. Edwards upheld 
the theocentric world view of Willard and seventeenth-century Puritanism. 
Chauncy and Mayhew picked up and carried on the tune that Wise began in 
the early eighteenth century, a tune of "supernatural rationalism." Like 
Wise, Chauncy and Mayhew advocated an anthropocentric theological 
anthropology. What is ironic, as Perry Miller has pointed out, is that the 
orthodox Puritan, Edwards, embraced the unifying psychology of the 
Enlightenment and that Chauncy and Mayhew, advocates of the 
Enlightenment doctrine of reason, the coherence of the universe, and the 
harmony of nature, could not break out of the bounds of medieval 
scholastic or faculty psychology.1
The emerging anthropocentric character of the concept of human nature 
that Wise, Mayhew, and Chauncy represent stands in opposition to the 
theocentric concept of human nature of Willard and Edwards. The 
anthropocentric concept of human nature advanced by Wise, Mayhew, and 
Chauncy points to the fact that New England Puritanism was changing. No 
longer would the world be explained from a theocentric stance without 
being challenged by an opposing anthropocentric argument. An
1 Perry Miller and Alan Heimert, eds. The Great 
Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and its
Consequences (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. xi.
94
anthropocentric world view would now vie with the theocentric world view 
for dominance in American religious thought.
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